web3-audit
# ClaudeWave: web3-audit The web3-audit command performs systematic security analysis of Solidity smart contracts by checking 10 common vulnerability classes including accounting desynchronization, access control flaws, incomplete code paths, off-by-one errors, oracle failures, ERC4626 issues, reentrancy, flash loan attacks, signature replay, and proxy upgrade vulnerabilities. Use this command when auditing smart contract codebases to identify high-severity security issues before deployment or during bug bounty hunting campaigns.
mkdir -p ~/.claude/commands && curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter/HEAD/commands/web3-audit.md -o ~/.claude/commands/web3-audit.mdweb3-audit.md
# /web3-audit
Smart contract security audit using the 10-bug-class methodology.
## Usage
```
/web3-audit VulnerableContract.sol
/web3-audit https://github.com/protocol/contracts
/web3-audit [paste contract code]
```
## Step 0: Pre-Dive Kill Signals
ALWAYS check these BEFORE reading any code:
```
1. TVL < $500K → max payout too low for effort → SKIP
2. 2+ top-tier audits (Halborn, ToB, Cyfrin, OZ) on simple protocol → SKIP
3. Protocol < 500 lines, single A→B→C flow → minimal attack surface → SKIP
4. max_payout = min(10% × TVL, program_cap) → if < $10K → SKIP
Formula: Is [TVL * 10%] > [hours I'll spend * hourly rate]? If not, skip.
```
Only proceed if score >= 6/10:
- TVL > $10M: +2
- Immunefi Critical >= $50K: +2
- No top-tier audit on current version: +2
- < 30 days since deploy: +1
- Protocol you've hunted before: +1
- Upgradeable proxies present: +1
## Step 1: Accounting State Desynchronization (28% of Criticals)
```bash
# Find accounting variables
grep -rn "totalSupply\|totalShares\|totalAssets\|totalDebt\|cumulativeReward" contracts/
# Find ALL early returns in critical functions
grep -rn "\breturn\b" contracts/ -B3 | grep -B3 "if\b"
```
Check: For each early return in claim/redeem/withdraw functions:
- Which state variables are updated in the normal path?
- Are ALL of them also updated in the early return path?
- If A updated but B isn't → potential desync bug
## Step 2: Access Control (19% of Criticals)
```bash
# Sibling function families — do ALL have same modifier set?
grep -rn "function vote\|function poke\|function reset\|function update\|function claim\|function harvest" contracts/ -A2
# Ownership check: existence vs ownership
grep -rn "_requireOwned\|ownerOf\|_isApprovedOrOwner" contracts/ -B5
# Silent modifiers (if without revert)
grep -rn "modifier\b" contracts/ -A8 | grep -B3 "if (" | grep -v "require\|revert"
# Uninitialized proxy
grep -rn "function initialize\b" contracts/ -A3
grep -rn "_disableInitializers()" contracts/
```
Check: Does EVERY sibling function in a family have the SAME modifiers?
## Step 3: Incomplete Code Path (17% of Criticals)
The function family comparison test:
```
1. List all state changes in function A (deposit/place/create)
2. List all state changes in function B (withdraw/update/cancel)
3. For each state change in A: does B have the corresponding reverse?
4. For each token transfer in A: does B have the corresponding refund?
```
```bash
grep -rn "safeApprove\b" contracts/ # safeApprove without zero-reset?
grep -rn "delete\b" contracts/ -B5 # delete before operation completes?
grep -rn "function deposit\|function mint\|function withdraw\|function redeem" contracts/ -A10
```
## Step 4: Off-By-One (22% of Highs)
Mental test: For EVERY `if (A > B)`: "What happens when A == B?" Is that correct?
```bash
# Boundary comparisons
grep -rn "Period\|Epoch\|Deadline\|period\|epoch\|deadline" contracts/ -A3 | grep "[<>][^=]"
# Loop breaks
grep -rn "\bbreak\b" contracts/ -B10
# Array bounds
grep -rn "\.length\s*-\s*1\|i\s*<=\s*.*\.length\b" contracts/
```
## Step 5: Oracle / Price Manipulation
```bash
# Missing staleness check
grep -rn "latestRoundData" contracts/ -A5 | grep -v "updatedAt\|timestamp"
# Pyth confidence interval
grep -rn "getPriceUnsafe\|getPrice\b" contracts/ -A8 | grep -v "conf\|confidence"
# TWAP windows
grep -rn "secondsAgo\|TWAP\|cardinality" contracts/ -A5
```
Check:
- Is staleness checked? (`require(block.timestamp - updatedAt <= MAX_AGE)`)
- Is Pyth confidence interval checked? (`require(conf * 10 <= price)`)
- Is TWAP window > 1800 seconds (30 min)?
## Step 6: ERC4626 Vaults
```bash
grep -rn "function deposit\|function mint\|function withdraw\|function redeem" contracts/ -A10
grep -rn "function transfer\|function transferFrom" contracts/ -A15
```
Check:
- Does `mint()` call the same validation as `deposit()`?
- Does `transfer()` move lock records along with shares?
- Is there a `_decimalsOffset()` virtual shares defense against first-depositor attack?
## Step 7: Reentrancy
```bash
# Effects after interactions
grep -rn "\.call{value\|safeTransfer\|transfer(" contracts/ -B10 | grep -v "require\|revert"
# Missing nonReentrant
grep -rn "function withdraw\|function redeem\|function claim" contracts/ -A2 | grep -v "nonReentrant"
```
Check: Does every function that transfers ETH or ERC20 follow CEI order?
(Checks → Effects → Interactions)
## Step 8: Flash Loan Oracle Manipulation
```bash
grep -rn "getReserves\|getAmountsOut\|slot0\b" contracts/ -A5
```
Check: Any spot price reading from Uniswap reserves/slot0? → flash loan manipulatable.
## Step 9: Signature Replay
```bash
grep -rn "ecrecover\|ECDSA\.recover" contracts/ -B20
grep -rn "nonce\|_nonces\|nonces\[" contracts/
```
Check: Does signed hash include: nonce + chainId + contract address?
## Step 10: Proxy / Upgrade
```bash
grep -rn "function initialize\b\|_disableInitializers\|initializer" contracts/
grep -rn "delegatecall\b" contracts/ -B3
grep -rn "0x360894\|_IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT\|EIP1967" contracts/
```
Check:
- `_disableInitializers()` in implementation constructor?
- Implementation can't be initialized directly by attacker?
- Storage layout compatible between versions?
## Confirming a Finding
Apply the 7-Question Gate:
```
1. Can I demonstrate this with a Foundry test?
2. What is the financial impact (quantify in $)?
3. Is this in the Immunefi scope?
4. Is it a known issue or acknowledged behavior?
5. Does my Foundry PoC actually run? (forge test -vvvv)
```
## Foundry PoC Template
```solidity
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import "forge-std/Test.sol";
import "../src/VulnerableContract.sol";
contract ExploitTest is Test {
VulnerableContract target;
address attacker = makeAddr("attacker");
function setUp() public {
vm.createSelectFork("mainnet", BLOCK_NUMBER);
target = VulnerableContract(TARGET_ADDRESS);
deal(address(token), attacker, INITIAL_BALANCE);
}
funcEnd-to-end Android APK red-team pipeline — automated APK acquisition (Play Store + apkpure + apkmirror fallback), jadx decompilation, secret/URL/JWT/Firebase grep, pinned-cert extraction, exported-component enumeration, Frida runtime instrumentation templates, intent-injection probes. Built from an authorized external red-team engagement where 7 APKs were pulled manually, 4 download attempts truncated, and a hardcoded JWT + 30 internal API endpoints were recovered from one of the apps. Use when target has a mobile app catalogue (Play Store developer page), when you find an APK URL hosted on a web server, or when post-recon mentions "mobile app" in scope.
Run autonomous hunt loop on a target — scope check → recon → rank surface → hunt → validate → report with configurable checkpoints. Usage: /autopilot target.com [--paranoid|--normal|--yolo]
Local-tooling companion to the bug-bounty orchestrator — carries the SAME complete bug-bounty workflow, but reach for THIS variant when you also need to resolve where tools, wordlists, and clones are installed on the local machine (jhaddix, SecLists, trufflehog, ffuf, dalfox, ghauri); for pure orchestration/routing use the bug-bounty skill. Workflow it covers — recon (subdomain enumeration, asset discovery, fingerprinting, HackerOne scope, source code audit), pre-hunt learning (disclosed reports, tech stack research, mind maps, threat modeling), vulnerability hunting (IDOR, SSRF, XSS, auth bypass, CSRF, race conditions, SQLi, XXE, file upload, business logic, GraphQL, HTTP smuggling, cache poisoning, OAuth, timing side-channels, OIDC, SSTI, subdomain takeover, cloud misconfig, ATO chains, agentic AI), LLM/AI security testing (chatbot IDOR, prompt injection, indirect injection, ASCII smuggling, exfil channels, RCE via code tools, system prompt extraction, ASI01-ASI10), A-to-B bug chaining (IDOR→auth bypass, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth), bypass tables (SSRF IP bypass, open redirect bypass, file upload bypass), language-specific grep (JS prototype pollution, Python pickle, PHP type juggling, Go template.HTML, Ruby YAML.load, Rust unwrap), and reporting (7-Question Gate, 4 validation gates, human-tone writing, templates by vuln class, CVSS 3.1, PoC generation, always-rejected list, conditional chain table, submission checklist). Use when you need the local install path of a tool / wordlist / clone for a hunt, or as the full-workflow variant when operating from this local toolkit; for general routing use the bug-bounty skill. 中文触发词：漏洞赏金、安全测试、渗透测试、漏洞挖掘、信息收集、子域名枚举、XSS测试、SQL注入、SSRF、安全审计、漏洞报告
Use at the START of any bug bounty hunting session, when switching targets, or when feeling lost about what to do next. Master orchestrator that combines the 5-phase non-linear hunting workflow with the critical thinking framework (developer psychology, anomaly detection, What-If experiments). Routes to all other skills based on current hunting phase. Also use when asking "what should I do next" or "where am I in the process.
Complete bug bounty workflow — recon (subdomain enumeration, asset discovery, fingerprinting, HackerOne scope, source code audit), pre-hunt learning (disclosed reports, tech stack research, mind maps, threat modeling), vulnerability hunting (IDOR, SSRF, XSS, auth bypass, CSRF, race conditions, SQLi, XXE, file upload, business logic, GraphQL, HTTP smuggling, cache poisoning, OAuth, timing side-channels, OIDC, SSTI, subdomain takeover, cloud misconfig, ATO chains, agentic AI), LLM/AI security testing (chatbot IDOR, prompt injection, indirect injection, ASCII smuggling, exfil channels, RCE via code tools, system prompt extraction, ASI01-ASI10), A-to-B bug chaining (IDOR→auth bypass, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth), bypass tables (SSRF IP bypass, open redirect bypass, file upload bypass), language-specific grep (JS prototype pollution, Python pickle, PHP type juggling, Go template.HTML, Ruby YAML.load, Rust unwrap), and reporting (7-Question Gate, 4 validation gates, human-tone writing, templates by vuln class, CVSS 3.1, PoC generation, always-rejected list, conditional chain table, submission checklist). Use for ANY bug bounty task — starting a new target, doing recon, hunting specific vulns, auditing source code, testing AI features, validating findings, or writing reports. 中文触发词：漏洞赏金、安全测试、渗透测试、漏洞挖掘、信息收集、子域名枚举、XSS测试、SQL注入、SSRF、安全审计、漏洞报告
Bugcrowd-specific reporting tactics complementing report-writing: VRT category search-and-fallback strategy when no exact match exists, manual severity override when VRT defaults underrate impact, severity-request paragraph as first body section, OOS-clause rebuttal templates (rate limiting on auth-flow endpoints, debug-info framing, user-enumeration with sensitive PII, theoretical-issue counter), chained-finding cross-reference patterns, target selection for QA-vs-prod programs, researcher-side hygiene (Bugcrowdninja email alias, account state restoration, friendly-tester posture). Use when filing a Bugcrowd submission, when VRT default seems wrong, when triager closes as OOS or downgrades severity, when chaining linked submissions, or when scope distinguishes production from QA. Pairs with report-writing and triage-validation.
Build an exploit chain — given bug A, finds B and C to combine for higher severity and payout. Knows common chain patterns: IDOR→ATO, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth. Usage: /chain
Cloud IAM red-team attack chain across AWS, Azure, GCP — focused on EXTERNAL exploitation paths and post-credential-discovery privilege analysis. Covers IAM enumeration (aws iam, az role, gcloud iam), STS/AssumeRole chaining, Azure Managed Identity abuse (via SSRF/leak), GCP service account JSON abuse, IMDSv1/v2 attacks via SSRF, K8s ServiceAccount token privilege analysis once held (token discovery / cluster exposure is owned by hunt-k8s), role-trust-policy confused-deputy, cross-account assume-role enumeration, IAM privilege escalation patterns (24+ AWS, 8+ Azure, 6+ GCP), and AWS Cognito Identity Pool unauthenticated-role attack chain (GetId → GetCredentialsForIdentity → IAM role abuse). Built for the case where recon yields a credential (key, JSON, token) and you need to know what it grants and how to escalate. Use when an AWS key / Azure secret / GCP service account JSON / K8s SA token surfaces from a code repo, JS bundle, APK, breach corpus, or SSRF chain.