hunt-misc
The hunt-misc skill identifies high-value miscellaneous vulnerabilities including access control failures, information disclosure, authentication logic bugs, and misconfigurations. Built from 225 public bug bounty reports, it provides attack surface patterns and methodology for hunting privilege escalation, multi-tenant data leaks, and credential management flaws in SaaS platforms and enterprise systems like Shopify, GitHub, and GitLab.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter /tmp/hunt-misc && cp -r /tmp/hunt-misc/skills/hunt-misc ~/.claude/skills/hunt-miscSKILL.md
## Crown Jewel Targets
**Why this vuln class pays:**
MISC vulnerabilities span access control failures, information disclosure, session/auth logic bugs, and misconfiguration — the categories that consistently produce the highest payouts because they map directly to business impact: data exposure, account takeover, privilege escalation, and infrastructure compromise.
**Highest-value targets:**
- **SaaS platforms with role hierarchies** (Shopify, GitHub, GitLab) — any boundary between owner/admin/staff/guest is a privilege escalation surface
- **Identity/auth flows** — invitation links, password reset, SAML SSO, OAuth token scopes
- **Multi-tenant systems** — one tenant touching another tenant's data
- **Internal APIs** — LFS endpoints, pre-receive hooks, internal GraphQL/REST that assume caller is trusted
- **Domain/DNS management features** — transfer controls, subdomain delegation
- **Token/credential management** — PAT scopes, deploy keys, API tokens stored in config fields
**Asset types that pay most:**
- Core product APIs (not marketing subdomains)
- Enterprise/self-hosted editions (GitHub Enterprise, GitLab EE)
- Partner/collaborator invitation systems
- OAuth app integrations and webhook endpoints
---
## Attack Surface Signals
**URL patterns to watch:**
```
/admin/*/transfer
/invitations/*
/partners/*/accept
/api/v*/repos/*/lfs/*
/-/settings/integrations/sentry
/api/v*/user/installations
/hooks/pre-receive/*
/reset-password?token=
/auth/saml/callback
/api/v*/packages/pypi/*
```
**Response header signals:**
```
X-Request-Id (pitchfork/Rack — check for header injection)
X-Shopify-Shop-Api-Call-Limit
X-GitLab-*
```
**JS patterns revealing internal surfaces:**
```javascript
// Look for hardcoded internal API paths
fetch('/internal/api/
graphql { installations(
"scope": [], // empty scopes on tokens
"permissions": {"contents": "read"} // minimal scope PATs
```
**Tech stack signals:**
- Ruby/Rack middleware (CRLF injection risk in `pitchfork`)
- SAML SSO enabled on enterprise instances
- PyPI proxy/mirror configurations (dependency confusion)
- Sentry error tracking integration fields (SSRF/token leak vector)
- Multi-role invitation systems (partners, staff, collaborators)
---
## Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology
1. **Map all role/permission boundaries** — enumerate every role level (owner → admin → staff → guest → removed) and document what each role *should* see
**Marker Discipline:** when probing role boundaries by injecting unique tokens / identifiers into per-role test data, markers MUST be unique random alphanumeric strings (8+ chars, no English words, no protocol keywords). Bad markers: `test`, `marker`, `attacker`, `evil`, `admin`, `AAAA`. Good markers: `cpmark987abc`, `x4hd2k9pq`. Before claiming any reflection, search the baseline (no-marker) response for the marker — if it appears naturally, change your marker.
**Body-Diff Rule:** a privilege-bypass claim requires response BODY differential, not status-code-only. 200 OK with byte-identical body to baseline is NOT a bypass. Always diff bodies side-by-side before claiming bypass. Status-code-only claims are the most common rejected-as-N/A category on bug-bounty platforms.
2. **Test invitation flows end-to-end** — accept invitations without completing verification steps; modify invitation tokens; test whether accepting an invitation as a different user grants access
3. **Test post-removal access** — add a user to a resource, remove them, then test if their session/token still grants access (especially after company/org removal)
4. **Fuzz token scope enforcement** — create PATs/tokens with minimal or no scopes, then call API endpoints that *should* require elevated scopes
5. **Test cross-tenant resource access** — as Tenant A, attempt to read/write Tenant B's resources by manipulating IDs, paths, or headers
6. **Probe internal/undocumented API endpoints** — look for LFS endpoints, internal GraphQL operations, pre-receive hook environments, webhook delivery logs
7. **Check SAML/SSO logic** — test signature verification bypass by stripping signatures, modifying NameID, replaying assertions, or manipulating XML namespace
8. **Audit configuration fields for SSRF/token exfiltration** — any URL field in admin settings (Sentry DSN, webhook URL, proxy URL) is a potential SSRF or credential leak
9. **Test password reset and email verification flows** — skip email verification steps; test whether reset tokens are scoped to a single user; test token reuse
10. **Check HTTP header injection points** — any user-controlled input passed into response headers via Ruby/Rack middleware; test CRLF sequences
11. **Verify DNS/subdomain hygiene** — enumerate subdomains, check for dangling CNAME records, verify SPF/DMARC/DKIM records
12. **Test package registry proxy configurations** — look for dependency confusion via forwarded requests to public registries (PyPI, npm, RubyGems)
---
## Payload & Detection Patterns
**CRLF/Header Injection (Ruby Net::HTTP, Rack/pitchfork):**
```bash
# Test CRLF in header values
curl -v "https://target.com/path" \
-H $'X-Custom: value\r\nInjected-Header: evil'
# URL-encoded variant
curl -v "https://target.com/redirect?url=https://evil.com%0d%0aSet-Cookie:%20session=attacker"
# Test in pitchfork/Rack apps — inject via query param reflected in Location header
curl -v "https://shop.myshopify.com/login?return_to=%0d%0aContent-Type:%20text/html%0d%0a%0d%0a<script>alert(1)</script>"
```
**Privilege escalation via invitation bypass:**
```bash
# Accept invitation without email verification
curl -X POST "https://target.com/invitations/INVITE_TOKEN/accept" \
-H "Cookie: session=UNVERIFIED_SESSION" \
-d '{"role":"admin"}'
# Test invitation token for another user
curl -X GET "https://target.com/partners/PARTNER_ID/invitation/accept?token=LEAKED_TOKEN" \
-H "Cookie: session=VICTIM_SESSION"
```
**Token scope bypass (GitHub/GitLab PAT):**
```bash
# Call privileged endpoint with minimal-scopeEnd-to-end Android APK red-team pipeline — automated APK acquisition (Play Store + apkpure + apkmirror fallback), jadx decompilation, secret/URL/JWT/Firebase grep, pinned-cert extraction, exported-component enumeration, Frida runtime instrumentation templates, intent-injection probes. Built from an authorized external red-team engagement where 7 APKs were pulled manually, 4 download attempts truncated, and a hardcoded JWT + 30 internal API endpoints were recovered from one of the apps. Use when target has a mobile app catalogue (Play Store developer page), when you find an APK URL hosted on a web server, or when post-recon mentions "mobile app" in scope.
Run autonomous hunt loop on a target — scope check → recon → rank surface → hunt → validate → report with configurable checkpoints. Usage: /autopilot target.com [--paranoid|--normal|--yolo]
Local-tooling companion to the bug-bounty orchestrator — carries the SAME complete bug-bounty workflow, but reach for THIS variant when you also need to resolve where tools, wordlists, and clones are installed on the local machine (jhaddix, SecLists, trufflehog, ffuf, dalfox, ghauri); for pure orchestration/routing use the bug-bounty skill. Workflow it covers — recon (subdomain enumeration, asset discovery, fingerprinting, HackerOne scope, source code audit), pre-hunt learning (disclosed reports, tech stack research, mind maps, threat modeling), vulnerability hunting (IDOR, SSRF, XSS, auth bypass, CSRF, race conditions, SQLi, XXE, file upload, business logic, GraphQL, HTTP smuggling, cache poisoning, OAuth, timing side-channels, OIDC, SSTI, subdomain takeover, cloud misconfig, ATO chains, agentic AI), LLM/AI security testing (chatbot IDOR, prompt injection, indirect injection, ASCII smuggling, exfil channels, RCE via code tools, system prompt extraction, ASI01-ASI10), A-to-B bug chaining (IDOR→auth bypass, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth), bypass tables (SSRF IP bypass, open redirect bypass, file upload bypass), language-specific grep (JS prototype pollution, Python pickle, PHP type juggling, Go template.HTML, Ruby YAML.load, Rust unwrap), and reporting (7-Question Gate, 4 validation gates, human-tone writing, templates by vuln class, CVSS 3.1, PoC generation, always-rejected list, conditional chain table, submission checklist). Use when you need the local install path of a tool / wordlist / clone for a hunt, or as the full-workflow variant when operating from this local toolkit; for general routing use the bug-bounty skill. 中文触发词：漏洞赏金、安全测试、渗透测试、漏洞挖掘、信息收集、子域名枚举、XSS测试、SQL注入、SSRF、安全审计、漏洞报告
Use at the START of any bug bounty hunting session, when switching targets, or when feeling lost about what to do next. Master orchestrator that combines the 5-phase non-linear hunting workflow with the critical thinking framework (developer psychology, anomaly detection, What-If experiments). Routes to all other skills based on current hunting phase. Also use when asking "what should I do next" or "where am I in the process.
Complete bug bounty workflow — recon (subdomain enumeration, asset discovery, fingerprinting, HackerOne scope, source code audit), pre-hunt learning (disclosed reports, tech stack research, mind maps, threat modeling), vulnerability hunting (IDOR, SSRF, XSS, auth bypass, CSRF, race conditions, SQLi, XXE, file upload, business logic, GraphQL, HTTP smuggling, cache poisoning, OAuth, timing side-channels, OIDC, SSTI, subdomain takeover, cloud misconfig, ATO chains, agentic AI), LLM/AI security testing (chatbot IDOR, prompt injection, indirect injection, ASCII smuggling, exfil channels, RCE via code tools, system prompt extraction, ASI01-ASI10), A-to-B bug chaining (IDOR→auth bypass, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth), bypass tables (SSRF IP bypass, open redirect bypass, file upload bypass), language-specific grep (JS prototype pollution, Python pickle, PHP type juggling, Go template.HTML, Ruby YAML.load, Rust unwrap), and reporting (7-Question Gate, 4 validation gates, human-tone writing, templates by vuln class, CVSS 3.1, PoC generation, always-rejected list, conditional chain table, submission checklist). Use for ANY bug bounty task — starting a new target, doing recon, hunting specific vulns, auditing source code, testing AI features, validating findings, or writing reports. 中文触发词：漏洞赏金、安全测试、渗透测试、漏洞挖掘、信息收集、子域名枚举、XSS测试、SQL注入、SSRF、安全审计、漏洞报告
Bugcrowd-specific reporting tactics complementing report-writing: VRT category search-and-fallback strategy when no exact match exists, manual severity override when VRT defaults underrate impact, severity-request paragraph as first body section, OOS-clause rebuttal templates (rate limiting on auth-flow endpoints, debug-info framing, user-enumeration with sensitive PII, theoretical-issue counter), chained-finding cross-reference patterns, target selection for QA-vs-prod programs, researcher-side hygiene (Bugcrowdninja email alias, account state restoration, friendly-tester posture). Use when filing a Bugcrowd submission, when VRT default seems wrong, when triager closes as OOS or downgrades severity, when chaining linked submissions, or when scope distinguishes production from QA. Pairs with report-writing and triage-validation.
Build an exploit chain — given bug A, finds B and C to combine for higher severity and payout. Knows common chain patterns: IDOR→ATO, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth. Usage: /chain
Cloud IAM red-team attack chain across AWS, Azure, GCP — focused on EXTERNAL exploitation paths and post-credential-discovery privilege analysis. Covers IAM enumeration (aws iam, az role, gcloud iam), STS/AssumeRole chaining, Azure Managed Identity abuse (via SSRF/leak), GCP service account JSON abuse, IMDSv1/v2 attacks via SSRF, K8s ServiceAccount token privilege analysis once held (token discovery / cluster exposure is owned by hunt-k8s), role-trust-policy confused-deputy, cross-account assume-role enumeration, IAM privilege escalation patterns (24+ AWS, 8+ Azure, 6+ GCP), and AWS Cognito Identity Pool unauthenticated-role attack chain (GetId → GetCredentialsForIdentity → IAM role abuse). Built for the case where recon yields a credential (key, JSON, token) and you need to know what it grants and how to escalate. Use when an AWS key / Azure secret / GCP service account JSON / K8s SA token surfaces from a code repo, JS bundle, APK, breach corpus, or SSRF chain.