hunt-ntlm-info
This Claude Code skill identifies NTLM information disclosure vulnerabilities on internet-exposed IIS, SharePoint, and Exchange servers by capturing anonymous NTLM Type-2 challenges. It extracts sensitive reconnaissance data including NetBIOS domain names, internal DNS forests, computer hostnames, and Active Directory timestamps from the NTLM protocol response. Use this skill when target services advertise WWW-Authenticate headers with NTLM or Negotiate methods, particularly on enterprise endpoints like SharePoint REST APIs, Exchange Web Services, or Outlook Web App instances.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter /tmp/hunt-ntlm-info && cp -r /tmp/hunt-ntlm-info/skills/hunt-ntlm-info ~/.claude/skills/hunt-ntlm-infoSKILL.md
## Crown Jewel Targets NTLM info disclosure is a **Medium-severity finding when chained to context** — the leak itself is intentional protocol behavior (RFC-compliant NTLMSSP challenge), but on internet-exposed enterprise infrastructure it provides exact reconnaissance for the next stage of an attack. Highest-value targets: - **Internet-reachable IIS / SharePoint / Exchange / OWA** with dual-auth (Forms + NTLM, or NTLM + Kerberos) - **Citrix NetScaler / VMware Horizon View** internet-facing gateways with NTLM-backed AD auth - **Lync / Skype for Business / Teams On-Prem** edge servers - **WSUS / Windows Update Services** with NTLM-protected admin paths - **CIFS-style fileshare proxies** (HCL Sametime, IBM Notes Domino) that proxy NTLM - **Legacy SharePoint farms** that left NTLM enabled on the public-zone IIS binding **What makes this pay:** - Internal AD domain disclosure (parent-forest mapping, e.g. `customer.parent-corp.example` → tenant inside corporate-AD tree) - Default-Windows-hostname disclosure (`WIN-XXXXXXXXXXX` pattern signals rushed provisioning → likely default service-account passwords) - Timestamp leak (used in NTLMv2 hash cracking acceleration) - Direct attack-map enrichment for credential spraying combined with `hunt-auth-bypass` Legacy-Protocol Matrix --- ## Attack Surface Signals **Response headers signaling NTLM availability:** ``` WWW-Authenticate: NTLM WWW-Authenticate: Negotiate WWW-Authenticate: NTLM, Negotiate WWW-Authenticate: Negotiate, NTLM ``` **URL patterns where NTLM is commonly exposed:** ``` /_api/web/CurrentUser (SharePoint REST) /_vti_bin/*.asmx (SharePoint legacy SOAP) /EWS/Exchange.asmx (Exchange Web Services) /Autodiscover/Autodiscover.xml (Exchange autodiscover) /owa/ (Outlook Web App) /Microsoft-Server-ActiveSync (ActiveSync) /PowerShell (Exchange Mgmt Shell over HTTPS) /api/v3/ (TeamCity, Atlassian) /wsus/ (Windows Server Update Services) /manager/html (some Tomcat behind IIS) /iisstart.htm (default IIS, sometimes reveals NTLM upstream) ``` **Tech-stack signals:** - IIS on the public internet (almost always NTLM-capable, even if Forms is the front) - SharePoint Web Front End (almost always dual-auth Forms + NTLM) - Exchange edge transport - Server header `Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0`, `Microsoft-IIS/*`, `IIS/*` --- ## Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology 1. **Probe every anonymous endpoint for `WWW-Authenticate: NTLM`.** Send a vanilla GET and inspect response headers. If NTLM is offered, proceed. 2. **Send a valid NTLMSSP Type-1 message anonymously.** The Type-1 base64 below requests NetBIOS-domain and Workstation info from the server: ``` Authorization: NTLM TlRMTVNTUAABAAAAB4IIogAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAGAbEdAAAADw== ``` This is the standard test Type-1 with negotiate flags `NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO`. The `OS Version` field (`06 01 B1 1D 00 00 00 0F`) is Windows 7 build 7601 — accepted by virtually every NTLM responder. 3. **Use a keep-alive raw socket, not Python requests / curl one-shot.** Most HTTP libraries close the connection between the Type-1 send and Type-2 reception. Use one of: - Burp Repeater with `Connection: keep-alive` set explicitly - Burp `mcp__burp__send_http1_request` (handles keep-alive natively) - Python raw `socket` + `ssl.wrap_socket` (see Payload section) 4. **Parse the Type-2 challenge from the `WWW-Authenticate: NTLM <base64>` response header.** Base64-decode the value. The structure is NTLMSSP per MS-NLMP: - Bytes 0-7: literal `NTLMSSP\0` - Bytes 8-11: MessageType = `\x02\x00\x00\x00` - Bytes 12-19: TargetName SecurityBuffer (len, alloc, offset) - Bytes 20-23: NegotiateFlags - Bytes 24-31: Server Challenge (8 bytes — useful for offline cracking) - Bytes 40-47: TargetInfo SecurityBuffer (len, alloc, offset) - TargetInfo body: `AV_PAIRS` array of (AvId u16, AvLen u16, Value) 5. **Decode the AV_PAIRS.** The AvIds you care about: - `1` = NetBIOS Computer Name - `2` = NetBIOS Domain Name - `3` = DNS Computer Name (FQDN of the responding server) - `4` = DNS Domain Name (the AD domain) - `5` = DNS Tree Name (the AD forest root) - `7` = Timestamp (FILETIME, useful for NTLMv2 hash relay / cracking) - `9` = Target Name (in newer NTLMSSP) 6. **Map findings to severity tier:** - Internet-exposed + default `WIN-XXXXXXXXXXX` hostname + corporate-AD-tree disclosure → **Medium** - Internet-exposed + named-server hostname (`SPWEB01.corp.example`) + corporate-AD-tree → **Low-Medium** - Intranet-only + any disclosure → **Informational** - Combine with `hunt-auth-bypass` Legacy-Protocol Matrix findings on the same host → **upgrade the auth-bypass finding's severity** since the attacker has UPN/SAM format ready 7. **Check the timestamp.** If `AV[7]` returns a current FILETIME within ~5s of `Date:` header, the system clock is synced — useful intel for Kerberos golden-ticket forging (out of bug-bounty scope but red-team relevant). 8. **Cross-reference with subdomain enum.** The DNS Tree name often reveals the *parent forest* — e.g. `customer.parent-corp.example` reveals the customer is a sub-domain INSIDE corporate-parent AD, not a separate tenant. This is a privacy / topology-disclosure escalation that programs sometimes accept as Medium. --- ## Payload & Detection Patterns **Generic NTLM Type-1 anonymous probe (curl + raw socket fallback):** ```bash # Most one-shot curl runs DON'T return Type-2 because the connection closes. # Use this as a quick probe to confirm NTLM is offered: curl -sk -I -H "Authorization: NTLM TlRMTVNTUAAB
End-to-end Android APK red-team pipeline — automated APK acquisition (Play Store + apkpure + apkmirror fallback), jadx decompilation, secret/URL/JWT/Firebase grep, pinned-cert extraction, exported-component enumeration, Frida runtime instrumentation templates, intent-injection probes. Built from an authorized external red-team engagement where 7 APKs were pulled manually, 4 download attempts truncated, and a hardcoded JWT + 30 internal API endpoints were recovered from one of the apps. Use when target has a mobile app catalogue (Play Store developer page), when you find an APK URL hosted on a web server, or when post-recon mentions "mobile app" in scope.
Run autonomous hunt loop on a target — scope check → recon → rank surface → hunt → validate → report with configurable checkpoints. Usage: /autopilot target.com [--paranoid|--normal|--yolo]
Local-tooling companion to the bug-bounty orchestrator — carries the SAME complete bug-bounty workflow, but reach for THIS variant when you also need to resolve where tools, wordlists, and clones are installed on the local machine (jhaddix, SecLists, trufflehog, ffuf, dalfox, ghauri); for pure orchestration/routing use the bug-bounty skill. Workflow it covers — recon (subdomain enumeration, asset discovery, fingerprinting, HackerOne scope, source code audit), pre-hunt learning (disclosed reports, tech stack research, mind maps, threat modeling), vulnerability hunting (IDOR, SSRF, XSS, auth bypass, CSRF, race conditions, SQLi, XXE, file upload, business logic, GraphQL, HTTP smuggling, cache poisoning, OAuth, timing side-channels, OIDC, SSTI, subdomain takeover, cloud misconfig, ATO chains, agentic AI), LLM/AI security testing (chatbot IDOR, prompt injection, indirect injection, ASCII smuggling, exfil channels, RCE via code tools, system prompt extraction, ASI01-ASI10), A-to-B bug chaining (IDOR→auth bypass, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth), bypass tables (SSRF IP bypass, open redirect bypass, file upload bypass), language-specific grep (JS prototype pollution, Python pickle, PHP type juggling, Go template.HTML, Ruby YAML.load, Rust unwrap), and reporting (7-Question Gate, 4 validation gates, human-tone writing, templates by vuln class, CVSS 3.1, PoC generation, always-rejected list, conditional chain table, submission checklist). Use when you need the local install path of a tool / wordlist / clone for a hunt, or as the full-workflow variant when operating from this local toolkit; for general routing use the bug-bounty skill. 中文触发词：漏洞赏金、安全测试、渗透测试、漏洞挖掘、信息收集、子域名枚举、XSS测试、SQL注入、SSRF、安全审计、漏洞报告
Use at the START of any bug bounty hunting session, when switching targets, or when feeling lost about what to do next. Master orchestrator that combines the 5-phase non-linear hunting workflow with the critical thinking framework (developer psychology, anomaly detection, What-If experiments). Routes to all other skills based on current hunting phase. Also use when asking "what should I do next" or "where am I in the process.
Complete bug bounty workflow — recon (subdomain enumeration, asset discovery, fingerprinting, HackerOne scope, source code audit), pre-hunt learning (disclosed reports, tech stack research, mind maps, threat modeling), vulnerability hunting (IDOR, SSRF, XSS, auth bypass, CSRF, race conditions, SQLi, XXE, file upload, business logic, GraphQL, HTTP smuggling, cache poisoning, OAuth, timing side-channels, OIDC, SSTI, subdomain takeover, cloud misconfig, ATO chains, agentic AI), LLM/AI security testing (chatbot IDOR, prompt injection, indirect injection, ASCII smuggling, exfil channels, RCE via code tools, system prompt extraction, ASI01-ASI10), A-to-B bug chaining (IDOR→auth bypass, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth), bypass tables (SSRF IP bypass, open redirect bypass, file upload bypass), language-specific grep (JS prototype pollution, Python pickle, PHP type juggling, Go template.HTML, Ruby YAML.load, Rust unwrap), and reporting (7-Question Gate, 4 validation gates, human-tone writing, templates by vuln class, CVSS 3.1, PoC generation, always-rejected list, conditional chain table, submission checklist). Use for ANY bug bounty task — starting a new target, doing recon, hunting specific vulns, auditing source code, testing AI features, validating findings, or writing reports. 中文触发词：漏洞赏金、安全测试、渗透测试、漏洞挖掘、信息收集、子域名枚举、XSS测试、SQL注入、SSRF、安全审计、漏洞报告
Bugcrowd-specific reporting tactics complementing report-writing: VRT category search-and-fallback strategy when no exact match exists, manual severity override when VRT defaults underrate impact, severity-request paragraph as first body section, OOS-clause rebuttal templates (rate limiting on auth-flow endpoints, debug-info framing, user-enumeration with sensitive PII, theoretical-issue counter), chained-finding cross-reference patterns, target selection for QA-vs-prod programs, researcher-side hygiene (Bugcrowdninja email alias, account state restoration, friendly-tester posture). Use when filing a Bugcrowd submission, when VRT default seems wrong, when triager closes as OOS or downgrades severity, when chaining linked submissions, or when scope distinguishes production from QA. Pairs with report-writing and triage-validation.
Build an exploit chain — given bug A, finds B and C to combine for higher severity and payout. Knows common chain patterns: IDOR→ATO, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth. Usage: /chain
Cloud IAM red-team attack chain across AWS, Azure, GCP — focused on EXTERNAL exploitation paths and post-credential-discovery privilege analysis. Covers IAM enumeration (aws iam, az role, gcloud iam), STS/AssumeRole chaining, Azure Managed Identity abuse (via SSRF/leak), GCP service account JSON abuse, IMDSv1/v2 attacks via SSRF, K8s ServiceAccount token privilege analysis once held (token discovery / cluster exposure is owned by hunt-k8s), role-trust-policy confused-deputy, cross-account assume-role enumeration, IAM privilege escalation patterns (24+ AWS, 8+ Azure, 6+ GCP), and AWS Cognito Identity Pool unauthenticated-role attack chain (GetId → GetCredentialsForIdentity → IAM role abuse). Built for the case where recon yields a credential (key, JSON, token) and you need to know what it grants and how to escalate. Use when an AWS key / Azure secret / GCP service account JSON / K8s SA token surfaces from a code repo, JS bundle, APK, breach corpus, or SSRF chain.