meme-coin-audit
Meme-coin-audit is a comprehensive security scanner for EVM and Solana tokens that detects rug pulls, honeypots, hidden mints, fee manipulation, and authority abuses. Use it before investing in or auditing meme coins, analyzing pump.fun or Raydium tokens, or performing pre-purchase due diligence on any new token project.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter /tmp/meme-coin-audit && cp -r /tmp/meme-coin-audit/skills/meme-coin-audit ~/.claude/skills/meme-coin-auditSKILL.md
# MEME COIN & TOKEN SECURITY AUDIT
Fast-kill rug pull detection and deep token security analysis for EVM and Solana meme coins.
---
## PRE-DIVE KILL SIGNALS
Check these BEFORE reading a single line of code. If any are true, skip the audit — the token is likely a rug or not worth the time.
### Hard Kills (Skip Immediately)
- **Contract not verified** on Etherscan/Solscan → Cannot audit source = cannot trust
- **Deployer wallet** has history of rug pulls (check Etherscan deployer page)
- **Token age < 1 hour** AND no known team → Too early, wait for more data
- **Mint authority retained** (Solana) AND no cap → Infinite mint = certain rug
- **Freeze authority retained** (Solana) on meme coin → Honeypot confirmed
- **Transfer hook present** (Token-2022) with mutable hook program → Honeypot vector
- **Permanent delegate** extension (Token-2022) → Can steal all holder tokens
### Soft Kills (Proceed with Extreme Caution)
- Top holder > 20% of supply (excluding DEX pools)
- LP not burned or locked in verified contract
- Contract is upgradeable / proxy with retained admin
- Less than $5K liquidity in the pool
- No social presence / anonymous deployer with no history
---
## THE ONE RULE
> **"Check ALL authorities and owner functions. The retained authority IS the rug vector."**
>
> Every rug pull requires a privileged operation: mint, blacklist, fee change, LP removal, or authority abuse. If you find the privilege, you found the bug.
---
## BUG CLASSES (8 TOKEN-SPECIFIC)
### 1. HIDDEN MINT / UNLIMITED SUPPLY
> Common rug pattern. Deployer mints tokens post-launch, dumps on LP.
**Quick grep (EVM):**
```bash
grep -rn "function mint\|_mint(\|_balances\[.*\] +=" src/ --include="*.sol" | grep -v "test\|lib\|node_modules"
```
**Quick grep (Solana):**
```bash
grep -rn "MintTo\|mint_to\|mint_authority" src/ --include="*.rs" | grep -v "test\|target"
```
**Kill if:** MAX_SUPPLY enforced in every mint path, or mint function removed entirely.
### 2. HONEYPOT / TRANSFER RESTRICTION
> Common scam pattern. Buy works, sell blocked.
**Quick grep:**
```bash
grep -rn "blacklist\|isBlacklisted\|_bots\|maxTxAmount\|approve.*override\|tradingEnabled" src/ --include="*.sol"
```
**Solana equivalent:**
```bash
grep -rn "freeze_authority\|transfer_hook\|TransferHook\|permanent_delegate" src/ --include="*.rs"
```
**Kill if:** No blacklist mapping, no transfer hooks, no freeze authority.
### 3. FEE MANIPULATION
> Common rug pattern. Sell fee set to 99% after initial buys.
**Quick grep:**
```bash
grep -rn "setFee\|setSellFee\|_taxFee\|_sellFee" src/ --include="*.sol"
grep -rn "function set.*Fee" -A5 src/ --include="*.sol" | grep -v "require\|MAX\|<="
```
**Kill if:** Fee setter has `require(fee <= MAX_FEE)` with MAX_FEE <= 10%.
### 4. LIQUIDITY POOL DRAIN
> LP removal, migration, or manipulation to crash price.
**Quick grep:**
```bash
grep -rn "migrateLP\|emergencyWithdraw\|\.sync()\|setPair\|setRouter" src/ --include="*.sol"
```
**Kill if:** LP tokens burned to dead address, no migration function, no pair setter.
### 5. BONDING CURVE MANIPULATION
> Exploits in pump.fun-style bonding curves.
**Quick grep:**
```bash
grep -rn "virtualReserve\|setCurve\|graduate\|bonding_curve" src/ --include="*.sol" --include="*.rs"
```
**Kill if:** Curve parameters immutable, graduation permissionless.
### 6. AUTHORITY RETENTION (SOLANA)
> Retained mint/freeze/update authorities on Solana tokens.
**Quick grep:**
```bash
grep -rn "mint_authority\|freeze_authority\|update_authority\|close_authority" src/ --include="*.rs"
grep -rn "set_authority.*None" src/ --include="*.rs" # Good sign: revocation
```
**Kill if:** All authorities = None, verified on-chain.
### 7. FAKE RENOUNCE / HIDDEN OWNERSHIP
> Ownership appears renounced but backdoor control retained.
**Quick grep:**
```bash
grep -rn "renounceOwnership.*override\|_shadowAdmin\|_backupOwner\|selfdestruct" src/ --include="*.sol"
```
**Kill if:** renounceOwnership NOT overridden, no second admin role, no selfdestruct.
### 8. SANDWICH AMPLIFICATION BY DESIGN
> Contract makes holders maximally sandwichable.
**Quick grep:**
```bash
grep -rn "swapExactTokensForETH" -A5 src/ --include="*.sol" | grep "0,"
grep -rn "swapThreshold\|_rebase\|mandatoryPool" src/ --include="*.sol"
```
**Kill if:** Auto-swap has proper slippage, no rebase mechanics.
---
## FAST RED-FLAG SWEEP
Run the 8 bug-class greps above across the source tree for fast red-flag detection. Together they catch:
- Direct mint/balance manipulation
- Blacklist and transfer restriction patterns
- Unbounded fee setters
- LP migration and emergency withdraw functions
- Fake renounce overrides
- Zero slippage auto-swaps
- All Solana authority patterns
- Token-2022 dangerous extensions
**Source grep does NOT check** (verify these out-of-band):
- On-chain state (use Etherscan/Solscan for authority verification)
- Holder distribution (use DEXTools/Birdeye)
- LP lock status (use Unicrypt/PinkLock/Solscan)
- Deployer wallet history (manual check)
---
## FOUNDRY POC TEMPLATE (TOKEN EXPLOITS)
```solidity
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import "forge-std/Test.sol";
import "../src/Token.sol";
contract TokenExploitTest is Test {
Token token;
address owner = makeAddr("owner");
address victim = makeAddr("victim");
address attacker = makeAddr("attacker");
// Uniswap V2 router (mainnet fork)
address constant ROUTER = 0x7a250d5630B4cF539739dF2C5dAcb4c659F2488D;
address constant WETH = 0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2;
function setUp() public {
vm.createSelectFork("mainnet");
// Deploy token as owner
vm.startPrank(owner);
token = new Token();
// Add liquidity...
vm.stopPrank();
}
function test_hiddenMint_rug() public {
// Step 1: Victim buys tokens
vm.startPrank(victim);
// ... buy tokens on Uniswap
vm.stopPrank();
// Step 2: Owner mints and dumpsEnd-to-end Android APK red-team pipeline — automated APK acquisition (Play Store + apkpure + apkmirror fallback), jadx decompilation, secret/URL/JWT/Firebase grep, pinned-cert extraction, exported-component enumeration, Frida runtime instrumentation templates, intent-injection probes. Built from an authorized external red-team engagement where 7 APKs were pulled manually, 4 download attempts truncated, and a hardcoded JWT + 30 internal API endpoints were recovered from one of the apps. Use when target has a mobile app catalogue (Play Store developer page), when you find an APK URL hosted on a web server, or when post-recon mentions "mobile app" in scope.
Run autonomous hunt loop on a target — scope check → recon → rank surface → hunt → validate → report with configurable checkpoints. Usage: /autopilot target.com [--paranoid|--normal|--yolo]
Local-tooling companion to the bug-bounty orchestrator — carries the SAME complete bug-bounty workflow, but reach for THIS variant when you also need to resolve where tools, wordlists, and clones are installed on the local machine (jhaddix, SecLists, trufflehog, ffuf, dalfox, ghauri); for pure orchestration/routing use the bug-bounty skill. Workflow it covers — recon (subdomain enumeration, asset discovery, fingerprinting, HackerOne scope, source code audit), pre-hunt learning (disclosed reports, tech stack research, mind maps, threat modeling), vulnerability hunting (IDOR, SSRF, XSS, auth bypass, CSRF, race conditions, SQLi, XXE, file upload, business logic, GraphQL, HTTP smuggling, cache poisoning, OAuth, timing side-channels, OIDC, SSTI, subdomain takeover, cloud misconfig, ATO chains, agentic AI), LLM/AI security testing (chatbot IDOR, prompt injection, indirect injection, ASCII smuggling, exfil channels, RCE via code tools, system prompt extraction, ASI01-ASI10), A-to-B bug chaining (IDOR→auth bypass, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth), bypass tables (SSRF IP bypass, open redirect bypass, file upload bypass), language-specific grep (JS prototype pollution, Python pickle, PHP type juggling, Go template.HTML, Ruby YAML.load, Rust unwrap), and reporting (7-Question Gate, 4 validation gates, human-tone writing, templates by vuln class, CVSS 3.1, PoC generation, always-rejected list, conditional chain table, submission checklist). Use when you need the local install path of a tool / wordlist / clone for a hunt, or as the full-workflow variant when operating from this local toolkit; for general routing use the bug-bounty skill. 中文触发词：漏洞赏金、安全测试、渗透测试、漏洞挖掘、信息收集、子域名枚举、XSS测试、SQL注入、SSRF、安全审计、漏洞报告
Use at the START of any bug bounty hunting session, when switching targets, or when feeling lost about what to do next. Master orchestrator that combines the 5-phase non-linear hunting workflow with the critical thinking framework (developer psychology, anomaly detection, What-If experiments). Routes to all other skills based on current hunting phase. Also use when asking "what should I do next" or "where am I in the process.
Complete bug bounty workflow — recon (subdomain enumeration, asset discovery, fingerprinting, HackerOne scope, source code audit), pre-hunt learning (disclosed reports, tech stack research, mind maps, threat modeling), vulnerability hunting (IDOR, SSRF, XSS, auth bypass, CSRF, race conditions, SQLi, XXE, file upload, business logic, GraphQL, HTTP smuggling, cache poisoning, OAuth, timing side-channels, OIDC, SSTI, subdomain takeover, cloud misconfig, ATO chains, agentic AI), LLM/AI security testing (chatbot IDOR, prompt injection, indirect injection, ASCII smuggling, exfil channels, RCE via code tools, system prompt extraction, ASI01-ASI10), A-to-B bug chaining (IDOR→auth bypass, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth), bypass tables (SSRF IP bypass, open redirect bypass, file upload bypass), language-specific grep (JS prototype pollution, Python pickle, PHP type juggling, Go template.HTML, Ruby YAML.load, Rust unwrap), and reporting (7-Question Gate, 4 validation gates, human-tone writing, templates by vuln class, CVSS 3.1, PoC generation, always-rejected list, conditional chain table, submission checklist). Use for ANY bug bounty task — starting a new target, doing recon, hunting specific vulns, auditing source code, testing AI features, validating findings, or writing reports. 中文触发词：漏洞赏金、安全测试、渗透测试、漏洞挖掘、信息收集、子域名枚举、XSS测试、SQL注入、SSRF、安全审计、漏洞报告
Bugcrowd-specific reporting tactics complementing report-writing: VRT category search-and-fallback strategy when no exact match exists, manual severity override when VRT defaults underrate impact, severity-request paragraph as first body section, OOS-clause rebuttal templates (rate limiting on auth-flow endpoints, debug-info framing, user-enumeration with sensitive PII, theoretical-issue counter), chained-finding cross-reference patterns, target selection for QA-vs-prod programs, researcher-side hygiene (Bugcrowdninja email alias, account state restoration, friendly-tester posture). Use when filing a Bugcrowd submission, when VRT default seems wrong, when triager closes as OOS or downgrades severity, when chaining linked submissions, or when scope distinguishes production from QA. Pairs with report-writing and triage-validation.
Build an exploit chain — given bug A, finds B and C to combine for higher severity and payout. Knows common chain patterns: IDOR→ATO, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth. Usage: /chain
Cloud IAM red-team attack chain across AWS, Azure, GCP — focused on EXTERNAL exploitation paths and post-credential-discovery privilege analysis. Covers IAM enumeration (aws iam, az role, gcloud iam), STS/AssumeRole chaining, Azure Managed Identity abuse (via SSRF/leak), GCP service account JSON abuse, IMDSv1/v2 attacks via SSRF, K8s ServiceAccount token privilege analysis once held (token discovery / cluster exposure is owned by hunt-k8s), role-trust-policy confused-deputy, cross-account assume-role enumeration, IAM privilege escalation patterns (24+ AWS, 8+ Azure, 6+ GCP), and AWS Cognito Identity Pool unauthenticated-role attack chain (GetId → GetCredentialsForIdentity → IAM role abuse). Built for the case where recon yields a credential (key, JSON, token) and you need to know what it grants and how to escalate. Use when an AWS key / Azure secret / GCP service account JSON / K8s SA token surfaces from a code repo, JS bundle, APK, breach corpus, or SSRF chain.