analyzing-malware-persistence-with-autoruns

# Analyzing Malware Persistence with Autoruns

## Overview

Sysinternals Autoruns extracts data from hundreds of Auto-Start Extensibility Points (ASEPs) on Windows, scanning 18+ categories including Run/RunOnce keys, services, scheduled tasks, drivers, Winlogon entries, LSA providers, print monitors, WMI subscriptions, and AppInit DLLs. Digital signature verification filters Microsoft-signed entries. The compare function identifies newly added persistence via baseline diffing. VirusTotal integration checks hash reputation. Offline analysis via -z flag enables forensic disk image examination.


## When to Use

- When investigating security incidents that require analyzing malware persistence with autoruns
- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques

## Prerequisites

- Sysinternals Autoruns (GUI) and Autorunsc (CLI)
- Administrative privileges on target system
- Python 3.9+ for automated analysis
- VirusTotal API key for reputation checks
- Clean baseline export for comparison

## Workflow

### Step 1: Automated Persistence Scanning

```python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Automate Autoruns-based persistence analysis."""
import subprocess
import csv
import json
import sys


def scan_and_analyze(autorunsc_path="autorunsc64.exe", csv_path="scan.csv"):
    cmd = [autorunsc_path, "-a", "*", "-c", "-h", "-s", "-nobanner", "*"]
    result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=600)
    with open(csv_path, 'w') as f:
        f.write(result.stdout)
    return parse_and_flag(csv_path)


def parse_and_flag(csv_path):
    suspicious = []
    with open(csv_path, 'r', errors='replace') as f:
        for row in csv.DictReader(f):
            reasons = []
            signer = row.get("Signer", "")
            if not signer or signer == "(Not verified)":
                reasons.append("Unsigned binary")
            if not row.get("Description") and not row.get("Company"):
                reasons.append("Missing metadata")
            path = row.get("Image Path", "").lower()
            for sp in ["\temp\\", "\appdata\local\temp", "\users\public\\"]:
                if sp in path:
                    reasons.append(f"Suspicious path")
            launch = row.get("Launch String", "").lower()
            for kw in ["powershell", "cmd /c", "wscript", "mshta", "regsvr32"]:
                if kw in launch:
                    reasons.append(f"LOLBin: {kw}")
            if reasons:
                row["reasons"] = reasons
                suspicious.append(row)
    return suspicious


if __name__ == "__main__":
    if len(sys.argv) > 1:
        results = parse_and_flag(sys.argv[1])
        print(f"[!] {len(results)} suspicious entries")
        for r in results:
            print(f"  {r.get('Entry','')} - {r.get('Image Path','')}")
            for reason in r.get('reasons', []):
                print(f"    - {reason}")
```

## Validation Criteria

- All ASEP categories scanned and cataloged
- Unsigned entries flagged for investigation
- Suspicious paths and LOLBin launch strings highlighted
- Baseline comparison identifies new persistence mechanisms

## References

- [Sysinternals Autoruns](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns)
- [SANS - Offline Autoruns Revisited](https://www.sans.org/blog/offline-autoruns-revisited-auditing-malware-persistence/)
- [Hunting Malware with Autoruns](https://nasbench.medium.com/hunting-malware-with-windows-sysinternals-autoruns-19cbfe4103c2)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1547 - Boot or Logon Autostart](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/)