offensive-advanced-redteam
This Claude Code skill provides a practical guide for advanced red team operations including command and control infrastructure design, operational security discipline, living-off-the-land techniques, lateral movement, persistence mechanisms, data exfiltration methods, and defense evasion strategies. Use this skill when planning authorized red team engagements, security assessments, or analyzing advanced persistent threat tactics and techniques.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/SnailSploit/Claude-Red /tmp/offensive-advanced-redteam && cp -r /tmp/offensive-advanced-redteam/Skills/infrastructure/offensive-advanced-redteam ~/.claude/skills/offensive-advanced-redteamSKILL.md
# Advanced Red Team Operations Red team engagements simulate real-world adversaries against an organization's people, processes, and technology. Unlike penetration tests that maximize vulnerability discovery in a fixed scope, red team operations test detection and response capabilities by pursuing specific objectives while evading defenders. You operate under rules of engagement that define what is in bounds, and every action you take must be deliberate, documented, and reversible. This skill covers the full engagement lifecycle from initial planning through final debrief. ## Quick Workflow 1. Negotiate scope, rules of engagement, and deconfliction procedures with the client. 2. Build tiered attack infrastructure with redirectors, aged domains, and valid TLS. 3. Configure C2 profiles to blend with the target's legitimate traffic patterns. 4. Execute the attack chain while maintaining strict OPSEC and logging every action. 5. Collect and stage data with encryption; maintain chain of custody throughout. 6. Evade endpoint and network defenses using tested bypass techniques. 7. Document findings with MITRE ATT&CK mappings and deliver structured reporting. 8. Conduct purple team debrief to validate detection gaps and remediation. --- ## Engagement Planning Every red team engagement begins with planning that protects both the operator and the client. Skipping this phase leads to scope disputes, legal exposure, and operational failures. ### Scope and Objectives Define what you are testing and what success looks like. Common objective types include data exfiltration (retrieve specific records from a database), domain dominance (obtain Domain Admin or equivalent), business process disruption (demonstrate ability to halt a critical workflow), and physical access (gain entry to a restricted area). Document explicitly what is out of scope: production systems that cannot tolerate downtime, third-party SaaS platforms without authorization, destructive actions, and social engineering of specific individuals (executives, legal counsel). ### Rules of Engagement (ROE) The ROE is a signed legal document. It must contain: - **Authorization window**: exact dates and hours of permitted activity. - **Authorized techniques**: which ATT&CK tactics are permitted (e.g., no physical access, no supply chain attacks). - **Notification thresholds**: conditions under which you must pause and notify the client (e.g., discovering active threat actor, finding child exploitation material, accidental data destruction). - **Emergency contacts**: a 24/7 phone number for immediate deconfliction, not just email. - **Legal shield**: explicit written authorization referencing the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (US), Computer Misuse Act (UK), or equivalent local statute. ### Deconfliction Establish a deconfliction process so defenders can verify whether observed activity is your operation or a real threat. Common approaches: - **Trusted agent model**: one or two individuals on the defender side who know the engagement is happening and can confirm or deny your activity via a secure channel. - **Code word system**: a unique code word embedded in your tooling or traffic that defenders can query the trusted agent about. - **Deconfliction log**: a timestamped record of every action you take, shared with the trusted agent in near-real-time via an encrypted channel. ```text # Example deconfliction log entry 2026-08-25T14:32:00Z | OPERATOR: kai | ACTION: lateral-movement TARGET: 10.10.5.22 (WORKSTATION-FIN03) TECHNIQUE: T1021.006 (Windows Remote Management) TOOL: evil-winrm via SOCKS proxy NOTES: creds from LSASS dump on WORKSTATION-FIN01 DECONF-CODE: REDTIGER-4482 ``` ### Communications Security All operator communications use end-to-end encrypted channels. Never discuss target details over unencrypted email or Slack. Use a dedicated encrypted messaging platform (Signal, Wire, or a self-hosted Matrix instance) for real-time coordination. Transfer files and logs over mutually authenticated TLS or via GPG-encrypted archives. --- ## Infrastructure Setup Your infrastructure is what separates a red team engagement from a penetration test run out of a Kali VM. Invest time in building infrastructure that is resilient, attributable only to your cover identity, and segmented so that burning one asset does not compromise the operation. Map infrastructure actions to MITRE ATT&CK Resource Development (TA0042). ### Tiered Architecture Segment infrastructure into at least three tiers: | Tier | Purpose | Burn Tolerance | Example | |------|---------|----------------|---------| | T1 - Delivery | Phishing, payload hosting | High (expect burn) | Aged domain + Mailgun | | T2 - Short-haul C2 | Interactive operator sessions | Medium | VPS + Cloudflare tunnel | | T3 - Long-haul C2 | Persistence callbacks | Low (protect at all costs) | DNS-over-HTTPS beacon | Each tier uses separate domains, separate VPS providers, and separate operator accounts. If T2 is burned, you re-establish interactive access through T3 without re-phishing. ### Domain Aging and Reputation Register domains at least 14-30 days before the engagement. During the aging period: ```bash # Set up a basic landing page to build categorization sudo certbot certonly --standalone -d ops-portal.example.com echo "<html><body>Coming soon</body></html>" > /var/www/html/index.html # Submit to categorization services # Visit: https://sitereview.bluecoat.com/ # Visit: https://www.fortiguard.com/webfilter # Categorize as "Business" or "Technology" - never "Uncategorized" # Verify categorization after 7-10 days curl -s "https://sitereview.bluecoat.com/resource/lookup" \ -d "url=ops-portal.example.com" | jq . ``` Choose domain names that blend with the target's industry. If the target is a financial firm, domains resembling fintech SaaS products are more plausible than gaming sites. ### Redirectors and Traffic Filtering Never expose your team server directly to the in
Active Directory attack methodology for internal network red team engagements. Covers reconnaissance (BloodHound, PowerView, ADExplorer), credential abuse (Kerberoasting, ASREProasting, NTLM relay, LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning), privilege escalation (ACL abuse, GPO abuse, unconstrained/constrained delegation), lateral movement (Pass-the-Hash, Pass-the-Ticket, Overpass-the-Hash, WMI/WinRM/PsExec), persistence (Golden/Silver/Diamond Tickets, DCSync, DCShadow, AdminSDHolder, Skeleton Key), forest trust attacks, ADCS abuse (ESC1-ESC15), and modern MDI/Defender for Identity evasion. Use when assessing on-prem AD, hybrid AD/Entra ID environments, or ADCS deployments.
JWT attack methodology for penetration testers. Covers algorithm confusion (alg:none, RS256→HS256), weak HMAC secret brute force, kid parameter injection (SQLi, path traversal), jku/x5u/jwk header injection, JWKS cache poisoning, JWS/JWE confusion, timing attacks, and mobile JWT storage extraction. Use when testing JWT-based authentication, hunting auth bypass via token manipulation, or evaluating JWT implementation security in web or mobile apps.
Cloud security attack methodology covering AWS, Azure, and GCP. Includes credential harvesting (IMDS, ~/.aws, env vars, leaked CI secrets, instance roles), enumeration with cloud-specific tools (pacu, ScoutSuite, Prowler, ROADtools, gcp_enum), privilege escalation paths (IAM PassRole, AssumeRole chains, Lambda/Functions privilege flips, Azure Owner-on-self, GCP serviceAccountTokenCreator), persistence techniques (IAM user/key creation, AAD app registration, GCP svc account key creation, EventBridge/Logic Apps backdoors), data exfiltration (S3/Blob/GCS, snapshot share, RDS/CosmosDB/Cloud SQL exfil), cloud-native lateral movement (cross-account assume, Azure AD multi-tenant, GCP project hierarchy), serverless attacks (Lambda env vars, layer hijack, Step Functions), Kubernetes-on-cloud (EKS/AKS/GKE-specific paths to node and AWS metadata), and CSPM evasion (CloudTrail blind spots, GuardDuty mute, Sentinel rule shaping). Use when the engagement scope is cloud accounts, when you've stolen cloud credentials, or when assessing cloud posture.