solana-vulnerability-scanner

# Solana Vulnerability Scanner

## 1. Purpose

Systematically scan Solana programs (native and Anchor framework) for platform-specific security vulnerabilities related to cross-program invocations, account validation, and program-derived addresses. This skill encodes 6 critical vulnerability patterns unique to Solana's account model.

## 2. When to Use This Skill

- Auditing Solana programs (native Rust or Anchor)
- Reviewing cross-program invocation (CPI) logic
- Validating program-derived address (PDA) implementations
- Pre-launch security assessment of Solana protocols
- Reviewing account validation patterns
- Assessing instruction introspection logic

## 3. Platform Detection

### File Extensions & Indicators
- **Rust files**: `.rs`

### Language/Framework Markers
```rust
// Native Solana program indicators
use solana_program::{
    account_info::AccountInfo,
    entrypoint,
    entrypoint::ProgramResult,
    pubkey::Pubkey,
    program::invoke,
    program::invoke_signed,
};

entrypoint!(process_instruction);

// Anchor framework indicators
use anchor_lang::prelude::*;

#[program]
pub mod my_program {
    pub fn initialize(ctx: Context<Initialize>) -> Result<()> {
        // Program logic
    }
}

#[derive(Accounts)]
pub struct Initialize<'info> {
    #[account(mut)]
    pub authority: Signer<'info>,
}

// Common patterns
AccountInfo, Pubkey
invoke(), invoke_signed()
Signer<'info>, Account<'info>
#[account(...)] with constraints
seeds, bump
```

### Project Structure
- `programs/*/src/lib.rs` - Program implementation
- `Anchor.toml` - Anchor configuration
- `Cargo.toml` with `solana-program` or `anchor-lang`
- `tests/` - Program tests

### Tool Support
- **Trail of Bits Solana Lints**: Rust linters for Solana
- Installation: Add to Cargo.toml
- **anchor test**: Built-in testing framework
- **Solana Test Validator**: Local testing environment

---

## 4. How This Skill Works

When invoked, I will:

1. **Search your codebase** for Solana/Anchor programs
2. **Analyze each program** for the 6 vulnerability patterns
3. **Report findings** with file references and severity
4. **Provide fixes** for each identified issue
5. **Check account validation** and CPI security

---

## 5. Example Output

---

## 6. Vulnerability Patterns (6 Patterns)

I check for 6 critical vulnerability patterns unique to Solana. For detailed detection patterns, code examples, mitigations, and testing strategies, see [VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md](resources/VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md).

### Pattern Summary:

1. **Arbitrary CPI** ⚠️ CRITICAL - User-controlled program IDs in CPI calls
2. **Improper PDA Validation** ⚠️ CRITICAL - Using create_program_address without canonical bump
3. **Missing Ownership Check** ⚠️ HIGH - Deserializing accounts without owner validation
4. **Missing Signer Check** ⚠️ CRITICAL - Authority operations without is_signer check
5. **Sysvar Account Check** ⚠️ HIGH - Spoofed sysvar accounts (pre-Solana 1.8.1)
6. **Improper Instruction Introspection** ⚠️ MEDIUM - Absolute indexes allowing reuse

For complete vulnerability patterns with code examples, see [VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md](resources/VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md).

## 7. Scanning Workflow

### Step 1: Platform Identification
1. Verify Solana program (native or Anchor)
2. Check Solana version (1.8.1+ for sysvar security)
3. Locate program source (`programs/*/src/lib.rs`)
4. Identify framework (native vs Anchor)

### Step 2: CPI Security Review
```bash
# Find all CPI calls
rg "invoke\(|invoke_signed\(" programs/

# Check for program ID validation before each
# Should see program ID checks immediately before invoke
```

For each CPI:
- [ ] Program ID validated before invocation
- [ ] Cannot pass user-controlled program accounts
- [ ] Anchor: Uses `Program<'info, T>` type

### Step 3: PDA Validation Check
```bash
# Find PDA usage
rg "find_program_address|create_program_address" programs/
rg "seeds.*bump" programs/

# Anchor: Check for seeds constraints
rg "#\[account.*seeds" programs/
```

For each PDA:
- [ ] Uses `find_program_address()` or Anchor `seeds` constraint
- [ ] Bump seed stored and reused
- [ ] Not using user-provided bump

### Step 4: Account Validation Sweep
```bash
# Find account deserialization
rg "try_from_slice|try_deserialize" programs/

# Should see owner checks before deserialization
rg "\.owner\s*==|\.owner\s*!=" programs/
```

For each account used:
- [ ] Owner validated before deserialization
- [ ] Signer check for authority accounts
- [ ] Anchor: Uses `Account<'info, T>` and `Signer<'info>`

### Step 5: Instruction Introspection Review
```bash
# Find instruction introspection usage
rg "load_instruction_at|load_current_index|get_instruction_relative" programs/

# Check for checked versions
rg "load_instruction_at_checked|load_current_index_checked" programs/
```

- [ ] Using checked functions (Solana 1.8.1+)
- [ ] Using relative indexing
- [ ] Proper correlation validation

### Step 6: Trail of Bits Solana Lints
```toml
# Add to Cargo.toml
[dependencies]
solana-program = "1.17"  # Use latest version

[lints.clippy]
# Enable Solana-specific lints
# (Trail of Bits solana-lints if available)
```

---

## 8. Reporting Format

### Finding Template
```markdown
## [CRITICAL] Arbitrary CPI - Unchecked Program ID

**Location**: `programs/vault/src/lib.rs:145-160` (withdraw function)

**Description**:
The `withdraw` function performs a CPI to transfer SPL tokens without validating that the provided `token_program` account is actually the SPL Token program. An attacker can provide a malicious program that appears to perform a transfer but actually steals tokens or performs unauthorized actions.

**Vulnerable Code**:
```rust
// lib.rs, line 145
pub fn withdraw(ctx: Context<Withdraw>, amount: u64) -> Result<()> {
    let token_program = &ctx.accounts.token_program;

    // WRONG: No validation of token_program.key()!
    invoke(
        &spl_token::instruction::transfer(...),
        &[
            ctx.accounts.vault.to_account_info(),