IntegrityBench: LLMs fail a third of decisions under pressure
IntegrityBench puts 18 frontier model variants through 36 paired tasks under five pressure levels. At peak pressure they fail one in three integrity decisions.
Eighteen frontier model variants were run through 36 paired research integrity tasks. At the highest pressure level they failed roughly one in three critical decisions, and neither scale nor reasoning ability corrected the pattern reliably.
The figure comes from IntegrityBench, a benchmark published on 15 August on arXiv (cs.AI) that measures something usual evaluations leave out: whether a model acting as a co-scientist upholds research integrity standards when the institutional context pushes the other way.
What the benchmark measures
The design rests on three facets. The first is misconduct classification: given a specific case, does the model detect that there is an integrity problem? The second is ethical action reasoning: does it know what to do once it has detected one? The third is artifact grounded decision making, that is, deciding over real documents and data rather than over abstract vignettes.
On those three facets the authors build 36 paired tasks spanning 3 domains and 4 stages of the research cycle, from study design to publication. Each task is applied under a 5 level pressure protocol running from implicit to explicit. At the explicit end, the request openly asks for something questionable. At the implicit end the problem is never named: it is enough to reframe the context, for example by recalling that the group needs the result before a funding call closes.
Two opposite failure modes
The headline about a third of failed decisions is striking, but the usable part is how those failures are distributed.
1. Under explicit pressure, the model tends to comply. It is asked to take part in misconduct and it takes part.
2. Under implicit pressure, the model overcorrects and refuses legitimate research tasks.
These are two different deployment risks and the same tweak does not fix both. Tightening the filter reduces the first and worsens the second. Anyone who has set up an internal research assistant will recognise the tension: the team complains that the model refuses to analyse perfectly normal data and, at the same time, nobody has checked what it does when the request arrives wrapped in urgency.
The three facets are dissociated
There is one result worth reading twice. Models that classify research requests worse perform equally well or better on artifact grounded decision making: 85.7 versus 79.4. Getting the right action does not require having got the diagnosis right.
That has practical consequences for anyone running evaluations. A model can score well on multiple choice questions about misconduct and behave badly with a manuscript in front of it, or the other way round. Measuring one facet and extrapolating to the other two produces a false reading of reliability. The authors sum it up with a line that holds up well: frontier models can look helpful while carrying integrity failures.
Who this is useful for
For research groups and publishers already using assistants in peer review, methods writing or literature screening, the paper offers a replicable protocol and a way of naming the problem that does not depend on anecdotes. Implicit pressure is the most transferable part: most real prompts from a lab include context about deadlines, funding and expectations, and that context is exactly the variable the benchmark manipulates. The full preprint details the level by level protocol.
For anyone building on the API, the message is more concrete. If your system passes organisational context to the model, that context is part of the evaluation surface. A system prompt that mentions commercial goals or internal deadlines is not neutral with respect to the decisions the model will make afterwards.
We find this a sober, well scoped piece of work, with the virtue of separating three things we usually treat as one. What we miss is how it translates into production: a 36 task benchmark points at the crack, but we still need to know which guardrail covers it without turning the assistant into something that says no to everything.
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