validate
The /validate command runs a systematic seven-question gate and four-checkpoint review process to assess whether a security finding meets submission standards before report writing. Use this to eliminate weak findings, prevent invalid submissions that damage validity metrics, and avoid wasting time on bugs that fail the program's scope, impact, or exploitability requirements.
mkdir -p ~/.claude/commands && curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter/HEAD/commands/validate.md -o ~/.claude/commands/validate.mdvalidate.md
# /validate Run full validation on the current finding before writing a report. ## What This Does 1. Runs 7-Question Gate (one wrong answer = kill it) 2. Checks against the always-rejected list 3. Runs 4 pre-submission gates 4. Outputs: PASS (write the report) or KILL (move on) ## Usage ``` /validate ``` Describe the finding when prompted. Include: - The endpoint - The bug class - What the PoC shows - The target program ## The 7-Question Gate Answer each. ONE wrong answer = STOP. ### Q1: Can I demonstrate this step-by-step RIGHT NOW? Write this out: ``` 1. Setup: I need [own account / another user's ID / no account] 2. Request: [exact HTTP method, URL, headers, body] 3. Result: Response shows [exact data / action completed] 4. Impact: Real consequence is [account takeover / PII exposed / money stolen] 5. Cost: Time: [X min], Capital: [$0 / $X] ``` If step 2 is "I need to look at the code more" → KILL IT. ### Q2: Is the impact accepted by this program? Check program scope page. Is your bug class listed? Is it excluded? ### Q3: Is the vulnerable asset in scope? Exact domain in scope? Not staging/dev? Not a third-party service? ### Q4: Does it need admin or privileged access that an attacker can't get? "Admin can do X" → KILL IT. "Regular user can do X that only admin should" → valid. ### Q5: Is this known or documented behavior? Search disclosed reports + changelog + API docs. ### Q6: Can you prove impact beyond "technically possible"? - XSS → actual cookie value in exfil request, not just alert() - SSRF → response body from internal service, not just DNS callback - IDOR → actual other-user's private data in response, not just 200 status ### Q7: Is this on the never-submit list? ``` Missing headers, GraphQL introspection alone, clickjacking without PoC, self-XSS, open redirect alone, SSRF DNS-only, logout CSRF, banner disclosure, rate limit on non-critical forms, missing cookie flags alone... ``` If yes → KILL IT unless you have a chain. ## Check: Conditionally Valid? If it's on the never-submit list, can you chain it? | You Have | Chain Available? | |---|---| | Open redirect | + OAuth code theft → ATO? | | SSRF DNS-only | + internal service data? | | Clickjacking | + sensitive action + PoC? | | CORS wildcard | + credentialed data exfil? | | Prompt injection | + IDOR → other user's data? | If no chain → KILL IT. If chain confirmed → report both together. ## 4 Gates — All Must Pass **Gate 0 (30 sec):** ``` [ ] Confirmed with real HTTP requests (not just code reading) [ ] In scope (checked program page) [ ] Reproducible from scratch [ ] Evidence captured ``` **Gate 1 — Impact (2 min):** ``` [ ] Can answer "What does attacker walk away with?" [ ] More than "sees non-sensitive data" [ ] Real victim exists [ ] No unlikely preconditions ``` **Gate 2 — Dedup (5 min):** ``` [ ] Searched HackerOne Hacktivity for endpoint + bug class [ ] Searched GitHub issues [ ] Read 5 most recent disclosed reports [ ] Not in changelog as known issue ``` **Gate 3 — Report quality (10 min):** ``` [ ] Title formula: [Class] in [Endpoint] allows [actor] to [impact] [ ] Steps have exact HTTP request [ ] Evidence shows actual impact [ ] CVSS calculated [ ] Fix: 1-2 concrete sentences ``` ## Output **PASS:** "All 7 questions pass. All 4 gates pass. Proceed to /report." **KILL:** "Q[N] fails because [reason]. Kill this finding. Reason: [explanation]. Move on." **DOWNGRADE:** "Q6 only shows technical possibility. Downgrade from High to Medium. Requires showing actual data exfil in PoC."
End-to-end Android APK red-team pipeline — automated APK acquisition (Play Store + apkpure + apkmirror fallback), jadx decompilation, secret/URL/JWT/Firebase grep, pinned-cert extraction, exported-component enumeration, Frida runtime instrumentation templates, intent-injection probes. Built from an authorized external red-team engagement where 7 APKs were pulled manually, 4 download attempts truncated, and a hardcoded JWT + 30 internal API endpoints were recovered from one of the apps. Use when target has a mobile app catalogue (Play Store developer page), when you find an APK URL hosted on a web server, or when post-recon mentions "mobile app" in scope.
Run autonomous hunt loop on a target — scope check → recon → rank surface → hunt → validate → report with configurable checkpoints. Usage: /autopilot target.com [--paranoid|--normal|--yolo]
Local-tooling companion to the bug-bounty orchestrator — carries the SAME complete bug-bounty workflow, but reach for THIS variant when you also need to resolve where tools, wordlists, and clones are installed on the local machine (jhaddix, SecLists, trufflehog, ffuf, dalfox, ghauri); for pure orchestration/routing use the bug-bounty skill. Workflow it covers — recon (subdomain enumeration, asset discovery, fingerprinting, HackerOne scope, source code audit), pre-hunt learning (disclosed reports, tech stack research, mind maps, threat modeling), vulnerability hunting (IDOR, SSRF, XSS, auth bypass, CSRF, race conditions, SQLi, XXE, file upload, business logic, GraphQL, HTTP smuggling, cache poisoning, OAuth, timing side-channels, OIDC, SSTI, subdomain takeover, cloud misconfig, ATO chains, agentic AI), LLM/AI security testing (chatbot IDOR, prompt injection, indirect injection, ASCII smuggling, exfil channels, RCE via code tools, system prompt extraction, ASI01-ASI10), A-to-B bug chaining (IDOR→auth bypass, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth), bypass tables (SSRF IP bypass, open redirect bypass, file upload bypass), language-specific grep (JS prototype pollution, Python pickle, PHP type juggling, Go template.HTML, Ruby YAML.load, Rust unwrap), and reporting (7-Question Gate, 4 validation gates, human-tone writing, templates by vuln class, CVSS 3.1, PoC generation, always-rejected list, conditional chain table, submission checklist). Use when you need the local install path of a tool / wordlist / clone for a hunt, or as the full-workflow variant when operating from this local toolkit; for general routing use the bug-bounty skill. 中文触发词：漏洞赏金、安全测试、渗透测试、漏洞挖掘、信息收集、子域名枚举、XSS测试、SQL注入、SSRF、安全审计、漏洞报告
Use at the START of any bug bounty hunting session, when switching targets, or when feeling lost about what to do next. Master orchestrator that combines the 5-phase non-linear hunting workflow with the critical thinking framework (developer psychology, anomaly detection, What-If experiments). Routes to all other skills based on current hunting phase. Also use when asking "what should I do next" or "where am I in the process.
Complete bug bounty workflow — recon (subdomain enumeration, asset discovery, fingerprinting, HackerOne scope, source code audit), pre-hunt learning (disclosed reports, tech stack research, mind maps, threat modeling), vulnerability hunting (IDOR, SSRF, XSS, auth bypass, CSRF, race conditions, SQLi, XXE, file upload, business logic, GraphQL, HTTP smuggling, cache poisoning, OAuth, timing side-channels, OIDC, SSTI, subdomain takeover, cloud misconfig, ATO chains, agentic AI), LLM/AI security testing (chatbot IDOR, prompt injection, indirect injection, ASCII smuggling, exfil channels, RCE via code tools, system prompt extraction, ASI01-ASI10), A-to-B bug chaining (IDOR→auth bypass, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth), bypass tables (SSRF IP bypass, open redirect bypass, file upload bypass), language-specific grep (JS prototype pollution, Python pickle, PHP type juggling, Go template.HTML, Ruby YAML.load, Rust unwrap), and reporting (7-Question Gate, 4 validation gates, human-tone writing, templates by vuln class, CVSS 3.1, PoC generation, always-rejected list, conditional chain table, submission checklist). Use for ANY bug bounty task — starting a new target, doing recon, hunting specific vulns, auditing source code, testing AI features, validating findings, or writing reports. 中文触发词：漏洞赏金、安全测试、渗透测试、漏洞挖掘、信息收集、子域名枚举、XSS测试、SQL注入、SSRF、安全审计、漏洞报告
Bugcrowd-specific reporting tactics complementing report-writing: VRT category search-and-fallback strategy when no exact match exists, manual severity override when VRT defaults underrate impact, severity-request paragraph as first body section, OOS-clause rebuttal templates (rate limiting on auth-flow endpoints, debug-info framing, user-enumeration with sensitive PII, theoretical-issue counter), chained-finding cross-reference patterns, target selection for QA-vs-prod programs, researcher-side hygiene (Bugcrowdninja email alias, account state restoration, friendly-tester posture). Use when filing a Bugcrowd submission, when VRT default seems wrong, when triager closes as OOS or downgrades severity, when chaining linked submissions, or when scope distinguishes production from QA. Pairs with report-writing and triage-validation.
Build an exploit chain — given bug A, finds B and C to combine for higher severity and payout. Knows common chain patterns: IDOR→ATO, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth. Usage: /chain
Cloud IAM red-team attack chain across AWS, Azure, GCP — focused on EXTERNAL exploitation paths and post-credential-discovery privilege analysis. Covers IAM enumeration (aws iam, az role, gcloud iam), STS/AssumeRole chaining, Azure Managed Identity abuse (via SSRF/leak), GCP service account JSON abuse, IMDSv1/v2 attacks via SSRF, K8s ServiceAccount token privilege analysis once held (token discovery / cluster exposure is owned by hunt-k8s), role-trust-policy confused-deputy, cross-account assume-role enumeration, IAM privilege escalation patterns (24+ AWS, 8+ Azure, 6+ GCP), and AWS Cognito Identity Pool unauthenticated-role attack chain (GetId → GetCredentialsForIdentity → IAM role abuse). Built for the case where recon yields a credential (key, JSON, token) and you need to know what it grants and how to escalate. Use when an AWS key / Azure secret / GCP service account JSON / K8s SA token surfaces from a code repo, JS bundle, APK, breach corpus, or SSRF chain.