m365-entra-attack
# m365-entra-attack This Claude Code skill provides red-team attack templates and enumeration vectors for Microsoft 365 and Entra ID environments, including tenant discovery methods, AADSTS error code interpretation, user enumeration techniques, Smart Lockout mathematics, and Conditional Access bypass exploration. Use this skill when engagement targets cloud-based Microsoft authentication, involves credential spraying against corporate email lists, or requires analysis of active attacker activity against M365 infrastructure.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter /tmp/m365-entra-attack && cp -r /tmp/m365-entra-attack/skills/m365-entra-attack ~/.claude/skills/m365-entra-attackSKILL.md
## When to use this skill
Trigger when:
- Target uses M365 / Entra ID (autodiscover.* records, login.microsoftonline.com redirects, "Microsoft Office 365" in tech-stack notes)
- You have a list of corporate emails or stealer-leaked creds
- Engagement involves "credential spray", "password spray", "Entra attack", "ATO via M365"
- You see `*.onmicrosoft.com`, `*-my.sharepoint.com`, `enterpriseregistration.*`, `enterpriseenrollment.*` in recon
- Client mentions "Conditional Access", "MFA bypass", "compliant device"
DO NOT use for:
- On-prem-only Active Directory (use a separate AD-attack skill)
- Service-to-service token attacks (different threat model)
- Phishing-required attack chains (covered by phishing skills) — but you can prep for the credential-validation step here
---
## Tenant discovery (msftrecon)
```bash
# For each owned domain
msftrecon -d client.example
msftrecon -d clientltd.example
msftrecon -d sister-brand-school.example
```
Key fields in output:
- **Tenant ID** (different domains may share OR have separate tenants — always test all owned domains)
- **Federation Information.Namespace Type** = `Managed` (cloud-only, ROPC works) | `Federated` (ADFS, different attack)
- **SharePoint Detected** (Yes = OneDrive enum vector available)
- **Communication Services Teams/Skype** (post-auth lateral targets)
- **Admin Consent Endpoint accessible** (consent-phishing surface)
**Red flag:** if the org has multiple Entra tenants for sister domains, each is a separate attack surface with its own user list, lockout policy, and CA configuration. Don't assume one spray covers all.
---
## AADSTS code reference (memorize)
| AADSTS | Meaning | Lockout impact | What to do |
|---|---|---|---|
| 50034 | User does not exist | None | Skip; remove from spray list |
| 50126 | Invalid username/password | +1 attempt counter | User exists — try alternate password later (within cap) |
| 50053 | Account locked (Smart Lockout) | None (already locked) | Pre-existing → flag to SOC; don't retry |
| 53003 | CA blocked token issuance | +1 attempt counter | **PASSWORD VALID** — STOP, password is correct |
| 50076 | MFA required | +1 attempt counter | **PASSWORD VALID** — second factor needed |
| 50079 | Strong auth required | +1 attempt counter | **PASSWORD VALID** — same as 50076 |
| 50158 | External auth required | +1 attempt counter | **PASSWORD VALID** — federated MFA |
| 530003 | Device-state required | +1 attempt counter | **PASSWORD VALID** — needs compliant device |
| 65001 | Consent required | +1 attempt counter | App-consent issue, not auth |
| 700016 | App not in tenant | None | User in different tenant — adjust target |
| 90002 | Tenant does not exist | None | Tenant typo / dead tenant |
**Critical insight:** any code in {53003, 50076, 50079, 50158, 530003} means **the password is correct** — Microsoft only returns these AFTER successful credential validation. Document as a confirmed-valid finding even if you can't get a token.
---
## Smart Lockout math (the cap discipline)
**Microsoft default policy:**
- 10 failed sign-ins in 10 minutes → 1-minute lockout
- 20 failed sign-ins → progressively longer lockouts (exponential backoff)
- Counter shared across **ALL auth flows** (ROPC + SAML + IMAP + EWS + SMTP + device-code)
**Engagement discipline:**
- Hard cap: ≤2 password attempts per user **lifetime per engagement** (some engagements: 1)
- State file with atomic writes — never let two test runs race the counter
- Kill switch: stop run if more than N LOCKED responses observed (suggests pre-existing attacker activity OR you miscounted; either way pause)
**Mathematical guarantee:** with 1 attempt per user, **you cannot cause Smart Lockout** (1 < 10). Any AADSTS50053 you see is therefore pre-existing → use this for active-attacker detection (see `mid-engagement-ir-detection` skill).
---
## User enumeration — vectors + hardening status (May 2026)
### ❌ HARDENED (no longer differential)
```http
GET /getuserrealm.srf?login=<email>&xml=1
```
Returns identical XML for any email matching tenant's owned domain. **Tenant-level only, not user-level.**
```http
POST /common/GetCredentialType
{"username":"<email>", "isOtherIdpSupported":true, ...}
```
Returns `AADSTS1659001` (missing flowToken) without proper session — can't enumerate.
```http
GET /autodiscover/autodiscover.json/v1.0/<email>?Protocol=AutodiscoverV1
```
Returns identical 200 + same JSON body for any address. Hardened ~2024.
### ✅ STILL WORKS (May 2026 — track shelf life)
**OneDrive personal-site differential:**
```http
GET /personal/<user>_<domain>_com/_layouts/15/onedrive.aspx HTTP/1.1
Host: <tenant>-my.sharepoint.com
```
- **302 → user EXISTS** (auth-required redirect to Authenticate.aspx)
- **404 → user does NOT exist** (404 FILE NOT FOUND)
- ZERO authentication attempt → ZERO lockout impact
- Bonus: `Sprequestduration` header faster (~40ms) for existing users vs ~600ms for non-existent — secondary timing oracle
**Caveats:**
- Only works if SharePoint is provisioned for the tenant (check msftrecon `SharePoint Detected: Yes`)
- Microsoft is hardening these endpoints over time — re-verify before relying on it
- Some users may exist in Entra without OneDrive provisioning (license-dependent) — false negatives possible
**2026-05-17 re-verification (authorized-engagement revalidation):** The OneDrive enum primitive STILL WORKS as of 2026-05-17. Calibration: licensed users return HTTP 200 with ~57KB body; nonexistent users / shared-mailbox accounts return 404 with 0 bytes. The /personal/ root path (without /_layouts/15/onedrive.aspx) returns the same differential.
**Killer use case: license differential = account-class signal.** Cross-reference OneDrive 200/404 with ROPC AADSTS50034/50126:
| OneDrive | ROPC | Classification |
|---|---|---|
| 200 | AADSTS50076 (MFA req) or 50126 | **Licensed regular user** (real employee, MFA enforced) |
| 200 | AADSTS50034 | (shouldn't happen — inconsistency, investigate) |
| 404 | AADSTS50126 | *End-to-end Android APK red-team pipeline — automated APK acquisition (Play Store + apkpure + apkmirror fallback), jadx decompilation, secret/URL/JWT/Firebase grep, pinned-cert extraction, exported-component enumeration, Frida runtime instrumentation templates, intent-injection probes. Built from an authorized external red-team engagement where 7 APKs were pulled manually, 4 download attempts truncated, and a hardcoded JWT + 30 internal API endpoints were recovered from one of the apps. Use when target has a mobile app catalogue (Play Store developer page), when you find an APK URL hosted on a web server, or when post-recon mentions "mobile app" in scope.
Run autonomous hunt loop on a target — scope check → recon → rank surface → hunt → validate → report with configurable checkpoints. Usage: /autopilot target.com [--paranoid|--normal|--yolo]
Local-tooling companion to the bug-bounty orchestrator — carries the SAME complete bug-bounty workflow, but reach for THIS variant when you also need to resolve where tools, wordlists, and clones are installed on the local machine (jhaddix, SecLists, trufflehog, ffuf, dalfox, ghauri); for pure orchestration/routing use the bug-bounty skill. Workflow it covers — recon (subdomain enumeration, asset discovery, fingerprinting, HackerOne scope, source code audit), pre-hunt learning (disclosed reports, tech stack research, mind maps, threat modeling), vulnerability hunting (IDOR, SSRF, XSS, auth bypass, CSRF, race conditions, SQLi, XXE, file upload, business logic, GraphQL, HTTP smuggling, cache poisoning, OAuth, timing side-channels, OIDC, SSTI, subdomain takeover, cloud misconfig, ATO chains, agentic AI), LLM/AI security testing (chatbot IDOR, prompt injection, indirect injection, ASCII smuggling, exfil channels, RCE via code tools, system prompt extraction, ASI01-ASI10), A-to-B bug chaining (IDOR→auth bypass, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth), bypass tables (SSRF IP bypass, open redirect bypass, file upload bypass), language-specific grep (JS prototype pollution, Python pickle, PHP type juggling, Go template.HTML, Ruby YAML.load, Rust unwrap), and reporting (7-Question Gate, 4 validation gates, human-tone writing, templates by vuln class, CVSS 3.1, PoC generation, always-rejected list, conditional chain table, submission checklist). Use when you need the local install path of a tool / wordlist / clone for a hunt, or as the full-workflow variant when operating from this local toolkit; for general routing use the bug-bounty skill. 中文触发词：漏洞赏金、安全测试、渗透测试、漏洞挖掘、信息收集、子域名枚举、XSS测试、SQL注入、SSRF、安全审计、漏洞报告
Use at the START of any bug bounty hunting session, when switching targets, or when feeling lost about what to do next. Master orchestrator that combines the 5-phase non-linear hunting workflow with the critical thinking framework (developer psychology, anomaly detection, What-If experiments). Routes to all other skills based on current hunting phase. Also use when asking "what should I do next" or "where am I in the process.
Complete bug bounty workflow — recon (subdomain enumeration, asset discovery, fingerprinting, HackerOne scope, source code audit), pre-hunt learning (disclosed reports, tech stack research, mind maps, threat modeling), vulnerability hunting (IDOR, SSRF, XSS, auth bypass, CSRF, race conditions, SQLi, XXE, file upload, business logic, GraphQL, HTTP smuggling, cache poisoning, OAuth, timing side-channels, OIDC, SSTI, subdomain takeover, cloud misconfig, ATO chains, agentic AI), LLM/AI security testing (chatbot IDOR, prompt injection, indirect injection, ASCII smuggling, exfil channels, RCE via code tools, system prompt extraction, ASI01-ASI10), A-to-B bug chaining (IDOR→auth bypass, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth), bypass tables (SSRF IP bypass, open redirect bypass, file upload bypass), language-specific grep (JS prototype pollution, Python pickle, PHP type juggling, Go template.HTML, Ruby YAML.load, Rust unwrap), and reporting (7-Question Gate, 4 validation gates, human-tone writing, templates by vuln class, CVSS 3.1, PoC generation, always-rejected list, conditional chain table, submission checklist). Use for ANY bug bounty task — starting a new target, doing recon, hunting specific vulns, auditing source code, testing AI features, validating findings, or writing reports. 中文触发词：漏洞赏金、安全测试、渗透测试、漏洞挖掘、信息收集、子域名枚举、XSS测试、SQL注入、SSRF、安全审计、漏洞报告
Bugcrowd-specific reporting tactics complementing report-writing: VRT category search-and-fallback strategy when no exact match exists, manual severity override when VRT defaults underrate impact, severity-request paragraph as first body section, OOS-clause rebuttal templates (rate limiting on auth-flow endpoints, debug-info framing, user-enumeration with sensitive PII, theoretical-issue counter), chained-finding cross-reference patterns, target selection for QA-vs-prod programs, researcher-side hygiene (Bugcrowdninja email alias, account state restoration, friendly-tester posture). Use when filing a Bugcrowd submission, when VRT default seems wrong, when triager closes as OOS or downgrades severity, when chaining linked submissions, or when scope distinguishes production from QA. Pairs with report-writing and triage-validation.
Build an exploit chain — given bug A, finds B and C to combine for higher severity and payout. Knows common chain patterns: IDOR→ATO, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth. Usage: /chain
Cloud IAM red-team attack chain across AWS, Azure, GCP — focused on EXTERNAL exploitation paths and post-credential-discovery privilege analysis. Covers IAM enumeration (aws iam, az role, gcloud iam), STS/AssumeRole chaining, Azure Managed Identity abuse (via SSRF/leak), GCP service account JSON abuse, IMDSv1/v2 attacks via SSRF, K8s ServiceAccount token privilege analysis once held (token discovery / cluster exposure is owned by hunt-k8s), role-trust-policy confused-deputy, cross-account assume-role enumeration, IAM privilege escalation patterns (24+ AWS, 8+ Azure, 6+ GCP), and AWS Cognito Identity Pool unauthenticated-role attack chain (GetId → GetCredentialsForIdentity → IAM role abuse). Built for the case where recon yields a credential (key, JSON, token) and you need to know what it grants and how to escalate. Use when an AWS key / Azure secret / GCP service account JSON / K8s SA token surfaces from a code repo, JS bundle, APK, breach corpus, or SSRF chain.