redteam-report-template
The redteam-report-template skill provides a standardized six-section structure (Subject, Observations, Description, Impact, Recommendation, Proof of Concept) for packaging security findings into client-facing red-team deliverables. Use this template when delivering external penetration test reports to enterprise clients under signed statements of work, particularly when findings will reach both technical and non-technical stakeholders and require DOCX or PDF output. Do not use for bug-bounty platform submissions or internal team documentation.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter /tmp/redteam-report-template && cp -r /tmp/redteam-report-template/skills/redteam-report-template ~/.claude/skills/redteam-report-templateSKILL.md
## When to use Use this skill for **client-deliverable** reports: - External red-team engagements with a signed SOW - Pentest reports going to a CISO / IT-Sec team (not a triager) - Findings that will be reviewed by both technical and non-technical stakeholders - Reports that need DOCX/PDF output (not just markdown / platform UI) Do NOT use for: - Bug-bounty platform submissions (use `report-writing` / `bugcrowd-reporting` instead) - Quick proof-of-concept memos - Internal team writeups --- ## The 6-section format per finding This is the canonical structure each finding follows: ```markdown ## Finding F##: <descriptive title> **Severity:** Critical / High / Medium / Low / Informational **Status:** Confirmed / Patched mid-engagement / Suspected (1 signal) **CVSS 3.1:** <score> (<vector>) **Affected Asset:** <URL / IP / app name> ### 1. Subject <One-line statement of the issue. Plain English, no jargon.> ### 2. Observations <Bulleted list of what was observed during testing. Concrete facts only — no interpretation yet.> - <Observation 1> - <Observation 2> - ... ### 3. Description <Technical explanation of the vulnerability. 2-4 paragraphs. Reader should understand WHY the observations indicate a vulnerability, what the underlying flaw is.> ### 4. Impact <What an attacker could achieve. Concrete attacker outcomes, NOT generic CIA triad statements. Tie to the client's business — money, data, reputation, regulatory exposure.> ### 5. Recommendation <Specific, actionable remediation. Vendor patch, configuration change, code-level fix. Avoid "implement security best practices" — say what specifically.> ### 6. Proof of Concept (PoC) <Steps to reproduce, numbered. Include the exact HTTP requests, payloads, tools used.> **Step 1:** <action> ```http <full HTTP request or curl one-liner> ``` **Step 2:** <action> ``` <response excerpt> ``` **Screenshot:**  ``` --- ## Severity & status disciplines ### Severity table (client-facing — different from CVSS-only) | Severity | Business definition | CVSS rough range | |---|---|---| | Critical | Direct revenue/data loss without prerequisites | 9.0-10.0 | | High | Full account/system takeover with limited prerequisites | 7.0-8.9 | | Medium | Significant data exposure or partial compromise | 4.0-6.9 | | Low | Information disclosure with limited exploitation path | 0.1-3.9 | | Informational | Hygiene finding, no immediate exploit | N/A | ### Status field (red-team-specific) This is the field that distinguishes red-team deliverables from bug-bounty reports. Use one of: - **Confirmed** — reproduced multiple times, with full PoC - **Confirmed; patched mid-engagement** — was reproducible, client patched during the test window (still ship the finding — see `mid-engagement-ir-detection`) - **Confirmed; partially reproducible** — works but needs specific conditions - **Suspected (1 signal)** — single indicator, not confirmed (rare — usually drop) - **Out-of-band** — finding from passive recon, not actively tested --- ## Mistakes to avoid (from authorized-engagement) ### 1. Don't retract findings that stopped reproducing If a finding was confirmed and then stopped working, that is almost always a CLIENT PATCH, not a finding-was-false. The correct response is "Confirmed; patched mid-engagement" with timestamps showing when it broke. See `mid-engagement-ir-detection`. ### 2. Don't hedge in the Impact section Bad: "An attacker could potentially be able to access user data, which may lead to..." Good: "An attacker reads any user's profile data. Demonstrated on test user `victim@target.com` at 14:22 IST." ### 3. Don't generic-CIA the impact Bad: "Loss of confidentiality and integrity of customer data" Good: "Read access to 247,000 customer records including PAN cards, addresses, GST numbers. India DPDPA Section 33 mandates 72-hour breach disclosure to DPB." ### 4. Don't list every recon finding as a finding Recon notes (subdomains found, ports open, technologies fingerprinted) belong in a separate **Recon / Attack Surface** appendix, not the findings list. A finding must have an attacker-attainable outcome. ### 5. Don't bury the PoC Each finding MUST have reproducible steps. The PoC section is what proves the finding to a skeptical reader. If you can't write the PoC clearly, the finding probably isn't ready to ship. --- ## Document-level structure ``` 1. Executive Summary (1 page, non-technical) - Engagement overview (dates, scope) - Risk posture summary (heat-map: <X critical, Y high, Z medium...>) - Top 3 strategic recommendations - Comparison to industry baseline (optional) 2. Engagement Details - Scope (in-scope, out-of-scope, exclusions) - Methodology (recon → exploit → reporting; or align with PTES / OSSTMM) - Tools used - Timeline (start / end / key milestones) - Team 3. Risk Summary Table | F# | Title | Severity | Status | |----|-------|----------|--------| | F01 | ... | Critical | Confirmed | ... 4. Findings (one per ## section, in severity order — Critical first) 5. Attack Surface / Recon Appendix - Subdomains discovered - Open ports / services - Technology fingerprints - APKs found - Credentials in breach corpora (count + sample only — redact) - Identity-fabric map (IdP, MFA posture) 6. Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) - Source IPs used during testing (so SOC can correlate) - User-Agent strings - Test accounts created - Files uploaded (with cleanup status) 7. Cleanup Statement - Confirmation that all test artifacts (accounts, uploads, persistence) were removed - Outstanding cleanup items requiring client action 8. Appendices (raw output, screenshots index, full target list) ``` --- ## DOCX generation pipeline (markdown → docx with embedded images) ```bash # Prerequisite: pandoc installed brew install pandoc # Convert pandoc REPORT_FINAL.md \ -o REPORT_FINAL.docx \ --resource-path=enga
End-to-end Android APK red-team pipeline — automated APK acquisition (Play Store + apkpure + apkmirror fallback), jadx decompilation, secret/URL/JWT/Firebase grep, pinned-cert extraction, exported-component enumeration, Frida runtime instrumentation templates, intent-injection probes. Built from an authorized external red-team engagement where 7 APKs were pulled manually, 4 download attempts truncated, and a hardcoded JWT + 30 internal API endpoints were recovered from one of the apps. Use when target has a mobile app catalogue (Play Store developer page), when you find an APK URL hosted on a web server, or when post-recon mentions "mobile app" in scope.
Run autonomous hunt loop on a target — scope check → recon → rank surface → hunt → validate → report with configurable checkpoints. Usage: /autopilot target.com [--paranoid|--normal|--yolo]
Local-tooling companion to the bug-bounty orchestrator — carries the SAME complete bug-bounty workflow, but reach for THIS variant when you also need to resolve where tools, wordlists, and clones are installed on the local machine (jhaddix, SecLists, trufflehog, ffuf, dalfox, ghauri); for pure orchestration/routing use the bug-bounty skill. Workflow it covers — recon (subdomain enumeration, asset discovery, fingerprinting, HackerOne scope, source code audit), pre-hunt learning (disclosed reports, tech stack research, mind maps, threat modeling), vulnerability hunting (IDOR, SSRF, XSS, auth bypass, CSRF, race conditions, SQLi, XXE, file upload, business logic, GraphQL, HTTP smuggling, cache poisoning, OAuth, timing side-channels, OIDC, SSTI, subdomain takeover, cloud misconfig, ATO chains, agentic AI), LLM/AI security testing (chatbot IDOR, prompt injection, indirect injection, ASCII smuggling, exfil channels, RCE via code tools, system prompt extraction, ASI01-ASI10), A-to-B bug chaining (IDOR→auth bypass, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth), bypass tables (SSRF IP bypass, open redirect bypass, file upload bypass), language-specific grep (JS prototype pollution, Python pickle, PHP type juggling, Go template.HTML, Ruby YAML.load, Rust unwrap), and reporting (7-Question Gate, 4 validation gates, human-tone writing, templates by vuln class, CVSS 3.1, PoC generation, always-rejected list, conditional chain table, submission checklist). Use when you need the local install path of a tool / wordlist / clone for a hunt, or as the full-workflow variant when operating from this local toolkit; for general routing use the bug-bounty skill. 中文触发词：漏洞赏金、安全测试、渗透测试、漏洞挖掘、信息收集、子域名枚举、XSS测试、SQL注入、SSRF、安全审计、漏洞报告
Use at the START of any bug bounty hunting session, when switching targets, or when feeling lost about what to do next. Master orchestrator that combines the 5-phase non-linear hunting workflow with the critical thinking framework (developer psychology, anomaly detection, What-If experiments). Routes to all other skills based on current hunting phase. Also use when asking "what should I do next" or "where am I in the process.
Complete bug bounty workflow — recon (subdomain enumeration, asset discovery, fingerprinting, HackerOne scope, source code audit), pre-hunt learning (disclosed reports, tech stack research, mind maps, threat modeling), vulnerability hunting (IDOR, SSRF, XSS, auth bypass, CSRF, race conditions, SQLi, XXE, file upload, business logic, GraphQL, HTTP smuggling, cache poisoning, OAuth, timing side-channels, OIDC, SSTI, subdomain takeover, cloud misconfig, ATO chains, agentic AI), LLM/AI security testing (chatbot IDOR, prompt injection, indirect injection, ASCII smuggling, exfil channels, RCE via code tools, system prompt extraction, ASI01-ASI10), A-to-B bug chaining (IDOR→auth bypass, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth), bypass tables (SSRF IP bypass, open redirect bypass, file upload bypass), language-specific grep (JS prototype pollution, Python pickle, PHP type juggling, Go template.HTML, Ruby YAML.load, Rust unwrap), and reporting (7-Question Gate, 4 validation gates, human-tone writing, templates by vuln class, CVSS 3.1, PoC generation, always-rejected list, conditional chain table, submission checklist). Use for ANY bug bounty task — starting a new target, doing recon, hunting specific vulns, auditing source code, testing AI features, validating findings, or writing reports. 中文触发词：漏洞赏金、安全测试、渗透测试、漏洞挖掘、信息收集、子域名枚举、XSS测试、SQL注入、SSRF、安全审计、漏洞报告
Bugcrowd-specific reporting tactics complementing report-writing: VRT category search-and-fallback strategy when no exact match exists, manual severity override when VRT defaults underrate impact, severity-request paragraph as first body section, OOS-clause rebuttal templates (rate limiting on auth-flow endpoints, debug-info framing, user-enumeration with sensitive PII, theoretical-issue counter), chained-finding cross-reference patterns, target selection for QA-vs-prod programs, researcher-side hygiene (Bugcrowdninja email alias, account state restoration, friendly-tester posture). Use when filing a Bugcrowd submission, when VRT default seems wrong, when triager closes as OOS or downgrades severity, when chaining linked submissions, or when scope distinguishes production from QA. Pairs with report-writing and triage-validation.
Build an exploit chain — given bug A, finds B and C to combine for higher severity and payout. Knows common chain patterns: IDOR→ATO, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth. Usage: /chain
Cloud IAM red-team attack chain across AWS, Azure, GCP — focused on EXTERNAL exploitation paths and post-credential-discovery privilege analysis. Covers IAM enumeration (aws iam, az role, gcloud iam), STS/AssumeRole chaining, Azure Managed Identity abuse (via SSRF/leak), GCP service account JSON abuse, IMDSv1/v2 attacks via SSRF, K8s ServiceAccount token privilege analysis once held (token discovery / cluster exposure is owned by hunt-k8s), role-trust-policy confused-deputy, cross-account assume-role enumeration, IAM privilege escalation patterns (24+ AWS, 8+ Azure, 6+ GCP), and AWS Cognito Identity Pool unauthenticated-role attack chain (GetId → GetCredentialsForIdentity → IAM role abuse). Built for the case where recon yields a credential (key, JSON, token) and you need to know what it grants and how to escalate. Use when an AWS key / Azure secret / GCP service account JSON / K8s SA token surfaces from a code repo, JS bundle, APK, breach corpus, or SSRF chain.