substrate-vulnerability-scanner
The substrate-vulnerability-scanner analyzes Substrate runtime pallets for seven critical security vulnerabilities including arithmetic overflow, panic denial-of-service, incorrect weight specifications, improper origin checks, unsafe unsigned transaction validation, unchecked storage mutations, and bad error handling. Use this skill when auditing custom FRAME pallets, reviewing Substrate chain runtimes before launch, or validating dispatchable extrinsic functions for security vulnerabilities.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/trailofbits/skills /tmp/substrate-vulnerability-scanner && cp -r /tmp/substrate-vulnerability-scanner/plugins/building-secure-contracts/skills/substrate-vulnerability-scanner ~/.claude/skills/substrate-vulnerability-scannerSKILL.md
# Substrate Vulnerability Scanner
## 1. Purpose
Systematically scan Substrate runtime modules (pallets) for platform-specific security vulnerabilities that can cause node crashes, DoS attacks, or unauthorized access. This skill encodes 7 critical vulnerability patterns unique to Substrate/FRAME-based chains.
## 2. When to Use This Skill
- Auditing custom Substrate pallets
- Reviewing FRAME runtime code
- Pre-launch security assessment of Substrate chains (Polkadot parachains, standalone chains)
- Validating dispatchable extrinsic functions
- Reviewing weight calculation functions
- Assessing unsigned transaction validation logic
## 3. Platform Detection
### File Extensions & Indicators
- **Rust files**: `.rs`
### Language/Framework Markers
```rust
// Substrate/FRAME indicators
#[pallet]
pub mod pallet {
use frame_support::pallet_prelude::*;
use frame_system::pallet_prelude::*;
#[pallet::config]
pub trait Config: frame_system::Config { }
#[pallet::call]
impl<T: Config> Pallet<T> {
#[pallet::weight(10_000)]
pub fn example_function(origin: OriginFor<T>) -> DispatchResult { }
}
}
// Common patterns
DispatchResult, DispatchError
ensure!, ensure_signed, ensure_root
StorageValue, StorageMap, StorageDoubleMap
#[pallet::storage]
#[pallet::call]
#[pallet::weight]
#[pallet::validate_unsigned]
```
### Project Structure
- `pallets/*/lib.rs` - Pallet implementations
- `runtime/lib.rs` - Runtime configuration
- `benchmarking.rs` - Weight benchmarks
- `Cargo.toml` with `frame-*` dependencies
### Tool Support
- **cargo-fuzz**: Fuzz testing for Rust
- **test-fuzz**: Property-based testing framework
- **benchmarking framework**: Built-in weight calculation
- **try-runtime**: Runtime migration testing
---
## 4. How This Skill Works
When invoked, I will:
1. **Search your codebase** for Substrate pallets
2. **Analyze each pallet** for the 7 vulnerability patterns
3. **Report findings** with file references and severity
4. **Provide fixes** for each identified issue
5. **Check weight calculations** and origin validation
---
## 5. Vulnerability Patterns (7 Critical Patterns)
I check for 7 critical vulnerability patterns unique to Substrate/FRAME. For detailed detection patterns, code examples, mitigations, and testing strategies, see [VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md](resources/VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md).
### Pattern Summary:
1. **Arithmetic Overflow** ⚠️ CRITICAL
- Direct `+`, `-`, `*`, `/` operators wrap in release mode
- Must use `checked_*` or `saturating_*` methods
- Affects balance/token calculations, reward/fee math
2. **Don't Panic** ⚠️ CRITICAL - DoS
- Panics cause node to stop processing blocks
- No `unwrap()`, `expect()`, array indexing without bounds check
- All user input must be validated with `ensure!`
3. **Weights and Fees** ⚠️ CRITICAL - DoS
- Incorrect weights allow spam attacks
- Fixed weights for variable-cost operations enable DoS
- Must use benchmarking framework, bound all input parameters
4. **Verify First, Write Last** ⚠️ HIGH (Pre-v0.9.25)
- Storage writes before validation persist on error (pre-v0.9.25)
- Pattern: validate → write → emit event
- Upgrade to v0.9.25+ or use manual `#[transactional]`
5. **Unsigned Transaction Validation** ⚠️ HIGH
- Insufficient validation allows spam/replay attacks
- Prefer signed transactions
- If unsigned: validate parameters, replay protection, authenticate source
6. **Bad Randomness** ⚠️ MEDIUM
- `pallet_randomness_collective_flip` vulnerable to collusion
- Must use BABE randomness (`pallet_babe::RandomnessFromOneEpochAgo`)
- Use `random(subject)` not `random_seed()`
7. **Bad Origin** ⚠️ CRITICAL
- `ensure_signed` allows any user for privileged operations
- Must use `ensure_root` or custom origins (ForceOrigin, AdminOrigin)
- Origin types must be properly configured in runtime
For complete vulnerability patterns with code examples, see [VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md](resources/VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md).
---
## 6. Scanning Workflow
### Step 1: Platform Identification
1. Verify Substrate/FRAME framework usage
2. Check Substrate version (v0.9.25+ has transactional storage)
3. Locate pallet implementations (`pallets/*/lib.rs`)
4. Identify runtime configuration (`runtime/lib.rs`)
### Step 2: Dispatchable Analysis
For each `#[pallet::call]` function:
- [ ] Arithmetic: Uses checked/saturating operations?
- [ ] Panics: No unwrap/expect/indexing?
- [ ] Weights: Proportional to cost, bounded inputs?
- [ ] Origin: Appropriate validation level?
- [ ] Validation: All checks before storage writes?
### Step 3: Panic Sweep
```bash
# Search for panic-prone patterns
rg "unwrap\(\)" pallets/
rg "expect\(" pallets/
rg "\[.*\]" pallets/ # Array indexing
rg " as u\d+" pallets/ # Type casts
rg "\.unwrap_or" pallets/
```
### Step 4: Arithmetic Safety Check
```bash
# Find direct arithmetic
rg " \+ |\+=| - |-=| \* |\*=| / |/=" pallets/
# Should find checked/saturating alternatives instead
rg "checked_add|checked_sub|checked_mul|checked_div" pallets/
rg "saturating_add|saturating_sub|saturating_mul" pallets/
```
### Step 5: Weight Analysis
- [ ] Run benchmarking: `cargo test --features runtime-benchmarks`
- [ ] Verify weights match computational cost
- [ ] Check for bounded input parameters
- [ ] Review weight calculation functions
### Step 6: Origin & Privilege Review
```bash
# Find privileged operations
rg "ensure_signed" pallets/ | grep -E "pause|emergency|admin|force|sudo"
# Should use ensure_root or custom origins
rg "ensure_root|ForceOrigin|AdminOrigin" pallets/
```
### Step 7: Testing Review
- [ ] Unit tests cover all dispatchables
- [ ] Fuzz tests for panic conditions
- [ ] Benchmarks for weight calculation
- [ ] try-runtime tests for migrations
---
## 7. Priority Guidelines
### Critical (Immediate Fix Required)
- Arithmetic overflow (token creation, balance manipulation)
- Panic DoS (node crash risk)
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