bitfence

# bitfence

**The risk layer agents can't skip.**

bitfence is a pre-transaction token risk oracle for autonomous AI agents
operating on Solana, Base, Ethereum, Arbitrum, BSC, and HyperEVM. Before an
agent
swaps, transfers, or interacts with a token, bitfence returns a structured
risk assessment in under a second: a composite score, confidence value,
action recommendation, and any active circuit-breaker flags.

- **Live on Solana, Base, Ethereum, Arbitrum, BSC, and HyperEVM**
- **HTTP API · MCP server · Rig (Rust) — Coinbase AgentKit coming soon**
- **$0.003 per query in USDC on Base via x402 — no API keys**

🔗 [bitfence.ai](https://bitfence.ai) · 📄 [Whitepaper](./WHITEPAPER.pdf) · 𝕏 [@bitfenceai](https://x.com/bitfenceai)

---

## Why this exists

Autonomous agents now hold keys, read mandates, and broadcast transactions
without a human in the loop. The agent frameworks shipping today expose swap
and transfer actions with no systematic pre-transaction safety check. The
risk-assessment tooling that exists was built for a human reading a wallet
pop-up — not a machine routing on structured fields.

bitfence fills the gap: a pre-intent token risk layer designed for machine
consumption. Neutral, transparent, agent-native, per-call priced. It is
complementary to existing wallet-grade tools, not competitive with them.

## What it scores

Risk is decomposed into six categories — each a distinct mechanism by which
a holder's position is destroyed — and assembled into a 0–100 composite with
maturity-aware scoring and structured circuit-breaker overrides.

| Category                | What it covers                                                                |
| ----------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **Exit Integrity**      | Honeypot behaviour (measured by bitfence's own transaction simulation on EVM chains), sell/transfer taxes and their modifiability, freeze authority, transfer blocking |
| **Supply Integrity**    | Mint authority, hidden ownership, owner-editable balances, permanent delegates, upgradeable proxies, selfdestruct, metadata mutability |
| **Liquidity Integrity** | LP lock and burn status, unlock schedule, pool depth, deployer-held LP, pool age |
| **Holder & Insider Risk** | Top-holder share, deployer share, holder count, sniper/insider/bundler cohorts, holder wallet ages |
| **Provenance**          | Deployer track record, observed prior rugs, vendor scam verdicts, launchpad lifecycle, verification registries |
| **Market Integrity**    | Wash-trade ratios, old-wallet flow share, price/volume divergence             |

Circuit breakers override the composite: measured threats (honeypot,
confiscatory sell tax, selfdestruct) block even trusted tokens; heuristic
flags floor the score for any token outside the curated trusted-token
registry. The reported confidence value reflects only the data sources
actually consulted, with cross-source disagreements excluded.

The full methodology is in the [whitepaper](./WHITEPAPER.pdf).

## Integration surfaces

The same scoring engine is exposed through four interfaces. Each returns the
same `RiskAssessment` structure.

- **HTTP/JSON API** — for any caller that speaks HTTP
- **MCP server** — for tool-calling LLM agents (Claude Desktop, MCP-enabled IDEs)
- **Coinbase AgentKit** — ActionProvider coming soon
- **Rig (Rust)** — typed in-process tool binding for Rust-native agents

For integration details, contact `info@bitfence.ai`.

## Pricing and access

- **$0.003 per query** in USDC on Base via [x402](https://github.com/coinbase/x402)
- Implemented against the Coinbase CDP facilitator
- No accounts, no API keys, no signups
- Listed on the Coinbase x402 Bazaar

## Open-source posture

Documentation, whitepaper, and integration surfaces are open under Apache
2.0. The scoring engine source remains closed for security reasons:
publishing exact circuit-breaker thresholds, signal weights, and maturity
logic would let adversarial token deployers engineer tokens that sit
immediately below the trigger points, defeating the protection bitfence
provides to agents downstream. This trade-off is discussed in the
[whitepaper](./WHITEPAPER.pdf).

A publishable methodology document — one useful to other Ethereum security
teams without exposing trigger logic to deployers — is in active
development.

## Security

See [SECURITY.md](./SECURITY.md) for vulnerability disclosure.

## License

[Apache License 2.0](./LICENSE)