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MCP server on the zipnative ZIP engine — 13 tools for AI agents: inspect, list and verify without extracting, extract with zip-slip / zip-bomb / symlink guards, create deterministic reproducible archives, modify without recompression. MCP 2026-07-28 + legacy, stdio & HTTP, sandboxed, no network path, ISO/IEC 21320-1 validated in CI. Node ≥22.

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ClaudeWave Trust Score
95/100
Verified
Passed
  • Open-source license (MIT)
  • Actively maintained (<30d)
  • Clear description
  • Topics declared
  • Documented (README)
Last scanned: 9/8/2026
Install in Claude Code / Claude Desktop
Method: Manual
Claude Code CLI
git clone https://github.com/Nizoka/zipnative-mcp
claude_desktop_config.json (Claude Desktop)
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "zipnative-mcp": {
      "command": "node",
      "args": ["/path/to/zipnative-mcp/dist/index.js"]
    }
  }
}
1. Run the command above in your terminal (Claude Code), or paste the JSON config into claude_desktop_config.json (Claude Desktop).
2. Replace any <placeholder> values with your API keys or paths.
3. Restart Claude. The MCP server and its tools appear automatically.
💡 Clone https://github.com/Nizoka/zipnative-mcp and follow its README for install instructions.
Use cases

MCP Servers overview

# zipnative-mcp

> **MCP server for ZIP archives — deterministic creation, inspection and listing without extracting, random-access entry reads, secure-by-default extraction, one-call verification, forward scanning of truncated streams, incremental modification without recompression, CRC-32 and raw-DEFLATE inflation** — 13 tools on the [zipnative](https://github.com/Nizoka/zipnative) engine (zero-dependency, ISO/IEC 21320-1 conformance validated in CI), for Claude Desktop, Cursor, ChatGPT and any MCP client.

[![npm version](https://img.shields.io/npm/v/zipnative-mcp.svg?logo=npm&color=cb3837)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/zipnative-mcp)
[![npm downloads](https://img.shields.io/npm/dm/zipnative-mcp.svg?logo=npm)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/zipnative-mcp)
[![Node version](https://img.shields.io/node/v/zipnative-mcp.svg?logo=node.js)](https://nodejs.org)
[![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue.svg)](LICENSE)
[![CI](https://github.com/Nizoka/zipnative-mcp/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/Nizoka/zipnative-mcp/actions/workflows/ci.yml)
[![ISO 21320-1 · veraZIP](https://github.com/Nizoka/zipnative-mcp/actions/workflows/verazip.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/Nizoka/zipnative-mcp/actions/workflows/verazip.yml)
[![MCP](https://img.shields.io/badge/MCP-2026--07--28-6f42c1.svg)](https://modelcontextprotocol.io)
[![zipnative](https://img.shields.io/badge/zipnative-1.0-2563EB.svg)](https://github.com/Nizoka/zipnative)
[![TypeScript](https://img.shields.io/badge/TypeScript-strict-3178c6.svg?logo=typescript&logoColor=white)](https://www.typescriptlang.org/)
[![OpenSSF Scorecard](https://api.scorecard.dev/projects/github.com/Nizoka/zipnative-mcp/badge)](https://scorecard.dev/viewer/?uri=github.com/Nizoka/zipnative-mcp)
[![CodeQL](https://github.com/Nizoka/zipnative-mcp/actions/workflows/codeql.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/Nizoka/zipnative-mcp/actions/workflows/codeql.yml)

---

## ✨ Features

`zipnative-mcp` exposes **13 tools** to any MCP host:

| Tool | What it does | Read-only |
| ---- | ------------ | :-------: |
| `inspect_zip` | ONE-call archive report: sizes, entry / file / directory counts, Zip64, comment, compressed vs uncompressed totals, per-method counts, encrypted / symlink / data-descriptor / Zip64 / cp437 / duplicate / unsafe-name counts, date range, a **determinism verdict** (the structural one: epoch timestamps + canonical order + UTF-8 flags) and every engine diagnostic. Opens eagerly: every entry's real extent is checked up front — overlapping entries, entries reaching into the central directory or past EOF, Zip64 spoofing — and refused with their `ZIP_*` code (a method / CRC / size divergence between central and local headers is caught by `verify_zip` and on read, not here). `check: […]` + `assert: {…}` turn it into a **CI gate**. | ✓ |
| `list_zip_entries` | Paged central-directory inventory, nothing decompressed — every entry as a full row (sizes, CRC-32, method, timestamp, flags, Unix mode, symlink, Zip64, offsets, extra fields, the sanitized path an extraction would use, raw name bytes). `filter` by names / prefix / glob, `offset` + `limit` (200 default, 2000 max). | ✓ |
| `read_zip_entry` | ONE entry by `name` or `index` without extracting: decompressed content as base64 or UTF-8 text (CRC-verified), a byte `range` through the chunked stream, the raw compressed payload (`mode: 'raw'`), or a non-throwing integrity check (`mode: 'verify'`). | ✓ |
| `verify_zip` | Deep verification in one call — the engine's `verifyZip` report verbatim: structure, every entry's CRC-32 / size / local-header agreement, encrypted entries honestly `skipped` — while an entry whose method has no codec here (anything but 0 store / 8 deflate) is reported **failed**, not skipped. **Never `isError` for an archive problem**: branch on `ok` and `error.code`. | ✓ |
| `extract_zip` | **Secure by default**: zip-slip / device names, symlinks, duplicate paths, declared-size and ratio bombs, overlapping entries and central/local divergence refused with frozen `ZIP_*` codes; relaxations are explicit named inputs that skip, never emit. Inline files (`includeData: false` = dry run — it opens eagerly and refuses an overlapping, offset-into-CD or Zip64-spoofed archive before returning any plan) or streamed into the sandbox with resource links. | |
| `scan_zip_forward` | Walk local headers in stream order with bounded memory — the only tool that works on a **truncated download or a cut / unseekable stream that starts at a local header**, and the only one whose result is NOT authoritative (`trust: 'local-headers-only'`). `tolerateTruncation: true` returns the partial inventory plus the error. It cannot skip an SFX / prepended prefix and refuses one (`ZIP_SIGNATURE_MISMATCH`): `inspect_zip` reports it (`prependedData`, `ZIP_PREPENDED_DATA`) and `modify_zip mode: 'compact'` drops it. | ✓ |
| `sanitize_entry_paths` | The engine's single traversal gate over a list of names: the safe `/`-relative form each maps to, or `null` with the rule that fired (traversal, absolute, drive, UNC, NUL, ADS, device name). No archive needed. | ✓ |
| `create_zip` | Write a ZIP from inline text / base64 / sandbox files (up to 100 000 entries — Zip64 auto-promotes past 65 535). **Reproducible on one runtime by default** (canonical order, DOS-epoch timestamps, UTF-8 names); `compression.deterministic: true` for identical bytes on every runtime — `summary.deterministic` is `true` ONLY then (a default call reports `false` with `deflateTier: 'node-zlib'`); store / deflate at archive or entry level; `order: 'insertion'` for EPUB / JAR; comments, Unix modes, extra fields; streamed sources; the worker pool (`parallel`, byte-identical); `includeSha256` proofs in base64 and file mode. | |
| `modify_zip` | add / replace / remove / rename / setComment **without recompressing anything**. `mode: 'append'` keeps the original bytes verbatim (removed content stays recoverable — data remanence, said loudly); `mode: 'compact'` rewrites canonically so it is truly gone. | |
| `compute_crc32` | The ZIP checksum (IEEE 802.3 CRC-32, the engine's slice-by-8) of text, base64 or a sandbox file streamed in 1 MiB chunks; `seed` chains chunks, `expect` compares. | ✓ |
| `inflate_raw` | Raw DEFLATE (RFC 1951) through the engine's resumable inflater with a **mandatory `maxOutput`** bound: exact `bytesConsumed`, trailing bytes as `leftover`. Feed it `read_zip_entry mode: 'raw'`. |  |
| `describe_engine` | Offline preflight: versions, deflate tiers, runtime codecs and workers, the engine's default limits, the operator ceilings, every server cap, sandbox / cache state, the 39 error codes and 11 diagnostic codes, the deliberately unexposed engine exports. `network` is always `'none'`. | ✓ |
| `draft_governance_issue` | Draft a governance-compliant GitHub issue **locally** for a **human** to review and submit — never submits, no network, no GitHub write path. | |

**What every tool guarantees:**

- 🔐 **Secure by default** — every engine guard is on; a relaxation is an explicit, named input (`rejectTraversal`, `rejectSymlinks`, `onDuplicate`, `limits`) that skips, never emits an unsafe path or materialises a link. Overlaps, central/local divergence and Zip64 spoofing have no opt-out at all.
- 🌐 **No network, ever** — the server has no network code path: no telemetry, no GitHub, no URL from any argument, no operator-configurable endpoint. The only filesystem boundary is `ZIPNATIVE_MCP_OUTPUT_DIR`.
- 🔁 **Reproducible by default, deterministic on request** — `create_zip` emits canonical order, DOS-epoch timestamps and UTF-8 names unless you opt out, so the bytes are stable on one runtime; `compression.deterministic: true` pins the pure-TypeScript encoder for identical SHA-256 on every runtime and is the only setting under which `summary.deterministic` is `true`; `inspect_zip.determinism` is the separate structural verdict (epoch timestamps required); `parallel` is byte-identical.
- 🧭 **Frozen `ZIP_*` error codes, verbatim** — the engine's 39-code vocabulary reaches you unchanged in `_meta.error.code` (with the entry name, the limit that fired, both CRCs, …), plus the wrapper's own 16 codes. Branch on the code, never on the message.
- 🪙 **Token-frugal projections** — the read tools accept `verbosity: 'summary'` and `fields: […]`; produced archives are delivered **once** as an embedded `resource` block, never duplicated into `structuredContent`.
- 📏 **ISO/IEC 21320-1 conformance gate** — every archive the tools write is validated clause by clause by an engine-independent validator (veraZIP) on Linux and Windows in CI and again before publish.

All archive-producing tools support two output modes:

- **`base64`** *(default)* — the archive is returned **once** as an embedded `resource` content block (a `data:application/zip;base64,…` URI); `structuredContent` carries `{ mode, sizeBytes, summary, diagnostics, diagnosticCounts }`.
- **`file`** — the archive is streamed into a sandboxed directory configured via `ZIPNATIVE_MCP_OUTPUT_DIR` (≤ 4 GiB, never overwritten) and the result carries a `resource_link`. File I/O is disabled unless this variable is set; absolute paths, traversal, non-container extensions and NUL bytes are all rejected, and the **real** path of every file read and of every parent written must stay inside the sandbox (a planted symlink or junction is `SECURITY_VIOLATION` on both sides). The same sandbox serves `zipPath` / `sourcePath` **inputs**, so a `create_zip → modify_zip → verify_zip → extract_zip` chain never re-sends the bytes.

**Token-frugal reads.** The read tools (`inspect_zip`, `list_zip_entries`, `read_zip_entry`, `verify_zip`, `scan_zip_forward`, `sanitize_entry_paths`, `describe_engine`) and `extract_zip` accept two optional inputs:

- `verbosity: 'summary'` — a compact scalar-only verdict (drops the rows and payloads). E.g. `verify_zip` → `{ ok, error, entryCount, verifiedCount, failedCount, skippedCount, diagnosticC
ai-agentsarchiveclaudecompressiondeterministicllm-toolsmcpmcp-servermodel-context-protocolnodejsreproducible-buildssecurity-by-defaulttypescriptunzipzero-dependencyzipzip-bombzip-slipzip64zipnative

What people ask about zipnative-mcp

What is Nizoka/zipnative-mcp?

+

Nizoka/zipnative-mcp is mcp servers for the Claude AI ecosystem. MCP server on the zipnative ZIP engine — 13 tools for AI agents: inspect, list and verify without extracting, extract with zip-slip / zip-bomb / symlink guards, create deterministic reproducible archives, modify without recompression. MCP 2026-07-28 + legacy, stdio & HTTP, sandboxed, no network path, ISO/IEC 21320-1 validated in CI. Node ≥22. It has 0 GitHub stars and its last recorded update is dated 2026-09-07.

How do I install zipnative-mcp?

+

You can install zipnative-mcp by cloning the repository (https://github.com/Nizoka/zipnative-mcp) or following the README instructions on GitHub. ClaudeWave also provides quick install blocks on this page.

Is Nizoka/zipnative-mcp safe to use?

+

Our security agent has analyzed Nizoka/zipnative-mcp and assigned a Trust Score of 95/100 (tier: Verified). See the full breakdown of passed checks and flags on this page.

Who maintains Nizoka/zipnative-mcp?

+

Nizoka/zipnative-mcp is maintained by Nizoka. The last recorded GitHub activity is dated 2026-09-07, with 8 open issues.

Are there alternatives to zipnative-mcp?

+

Yes. On ClaudeWave you can browse similar mcp servers at /categories/mcp, sorted by popularity or recent activity.

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